---
type: "mapping-set"
title: "CWE weaknesses → #8 Physical Attack"
description: "16 CWE weaknesses entries mapped to TLCTC #8 Physical Attack."
resource: "tlctc:mapping:cwe:cluster-8"
tags:
  - "mapping"
  - "cwe"
  - "cluster-8"
---
# CWE weaknesses → #8 Physical Attack

> Source: MITRE CWE → TLCTC mapping (`mappings/mitre-cwe/`). AI-generated, human-reviewed; experimental.

Mapped entries: **16**. Cluster: [#8 Physical Attack](/clusters/cluster-8.md).

| CWE | Name | TLCTC | Verdict | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CWE-1246 | Improper Write Handling in Limited-write Non-Volatile Memories | #8 | Allowed | Limited-write non-volatile memories degrade physically with write cycles; the attacker exhausts cell endurance. Per R-SUBSTRATE the physical-layer property is itself the exploited generic vulnerability, not merely the readout channel: applying the removal test, if the physical property behaved ideally no flaw would remain. Confirmed #8 in the 2026-08-07 R-SUBSTRATE re-audit. Note that attacker proximity is not the criterion — software-triggered exploitation of a physical property (Rowhammer, CLKSCREW-class voltage/clock manipulation) is equally #8. |
| CWE-1247 | Improper Protection Against Voltage and Clock Glitches | #8 | Allowed | Voltage and clock glitching drives the part outside its electrical operating envelope to induce faults. Per R-SUBSTRATE the physical-layer property is itself the exploited generic vulnerability, not merely the readout channel: applying the removal test, if the physical property behaved ideally no flaw would remain. Confirmed #8 in the 2026-08-07 R-SUBSTRATE re-audit. Note that attacker proximity is not the criterion — software-triggered exploitation of a physical property (Rowhammer, CLKSCREW-class voltage/clock manipulation) is equally #8. |
| CWE-1248 | Semiconductor Defects in Hardware Logic with Security-Sensitive Implications | #8 | Allowed | Semiconductor defects are material flaws in the fabricated device itself. Per R-SUBSTRATE the physical-layer property is itself the exploited generic vulnerability, not merely the readout channel: applying the removal test, if the physical property behaved ideally no flaw would remain. Confirmed #8 in the 2026-08-07 R-SUBSTRATE re-audit. Note that attacker proximity is not the criterion — software-triggered exploitation of a physical property (Rowhammer, CLKSCREW-class voltage/clock manipulation) is equally #8. |
| CWE-1255 | Comparison Logic is Vulnerable to Power Side-Channel Attacks | #8 | Allowed | Power draw during comparison correlates with the secret; the emission carries the data. Per R-SUBSTRATE the physical-layer property is itself the exploited generic vulnerability, not merely the readout channel: applying the removal test, if the physical property behaved ideally no flaw would remain. Confirmed #8 in the 2026-08-07 R-SUBSTRATE re-audit. Note that attacker proximity is not the criterion — software-triggered exploitation of a physical property (Rowhammer, CLKSCREW-class voltage/clock manipulation) is equally #8. |
| CWE-1261 | Improper Handling of Single Event Upsets | #8 | Allowed | Single event upsets are charge disturbances induced by ionising radiation. Per R-SUBSTRATE the physical-layer property is itself the exploited generic vulnerability, not merely the readout channel: applying the removal test, if the physical property behaved ideally no flaw would remain. Confirmed #8 in the 2026-08-07 R-SUBSTRATE re-audit. Note that attacker proximity is not the criterion — software-triggered exploitation of a physical property (Rowhammer, CLKSCREW-class voltage/clock manipulation) is equally #8. |
| CWE-1263 | Improper Physical Access Control | #8 | Allowed | The weakness is the absence of physical access control to the device. Per R-SUBSTRATE the physical-layer property is itself the exploited generic vulnerability, not merely the readout channel: applying the removal test, if the physical property behaved ideally no flaw would remain. Confirmed #8 in the 2026-08-07 R-SUBSTRATE re-audit. Note that attacker proximity is not the criterion — software-triggered exploitation of a physical property (Rowhammer, CLKSCREW-class voltage/clock manipulation) is equally #8. |
| CWE-1266 | Improper Scrubbing of Sensitive Data from Decommissioned Device | #8 | Allowed | Exploitation requires possession of decommissioned physical media retaining readable charge or magnetic state. Per R-SUBSTRATE the physical-layer property is itself the exploited generic vulnerability, not merely the readout channel: applying the removal test, if the physical property behaved ideally no flaw would remain. Confirmed #8 in the 2026-08-07 R-SUBSTRATE re-audit. Note that attacker proximity is not the criterion — software-triggered exploitation of a physical property (Rowhammer, CLKSCREW-class voltage/clock manipulation) is equally #8. |
| CWE-1278 | Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques | #8 | Allowed | Imaging the die recovers design secrets from the physical structure of the integrated circuit. Per R-SUBSTRATE the physical-layer property is itself the exploited generic vulnerability, not merely the readout channel: applying the removal test, if the physical property behaved ideally no flaw would remain. Confirmed #8 in the 2026-08-07 R-SUBSTRATE re-audit. Note that attacker proximity is not the criterion — software-triggered exploitation of a physical property (Rowhammer, CLKSCREW-class voltage/clock manipulation) is equally #8. |
| CWE-1300 | Improper Protection of Physical Side Channels | #8 | Allowed | Power, electromagnetic, and acoustic emissions carry secret-correlated information; the cryptography itself is correct. Per R-SUBSTRATE the physical-layer property is itself the exploited generic vulnerability, not merely the readout channel: applying the removal test, if the physical property behaved ideally no flaw would remain. Confirmed #8 in the 2026-08-07 R-SUBSTRATE re-audit. Note that attacker proximity is not the criterion — software-triggered exploitation of a physical property (Rowhammer, CLKSCREW-class voltage/clock manipulation) is equally #8. |
| CWE-1319 | Improper Protection against Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EM-FI) | #8 | Allowed | Electromagnetic fault injection couples energy into the device to corrupt computation. Per R-SUBSTRATE the physical-layer property is itself the exploited generic vulnerability, not merely the readout channel: applying the removal test, if the physical property behaved ideally no flaw would remain. Confirmed #8 in the 2026-08-07 R-SUBSTRATE re-audit. Note that attacker proximity is not the criterion — software-triggered exploitation of a physical property (Rowhammer, CLKSCREW-class voltage/clock manipulation) is equally #8. |
| CWE-1330 | Remanent Data Readable after Memory Erase | #8 | Allowed | Data remanence is the persistence of physical charge or magnetic state after a logical erase. Per R-SUBSTRATE the physical-layer property is itself the exploited generic vulnerability, not merely the readout channel: applying the removal test, if the physical property behaved ideally no flaw would remain. Confirmed #8 in the 2026-08-07 R-SUBSTRATE re-audit. Note that attacker proximity is not the criterion — software-triggered exploitation of a physical property (Rowhammer, CLKSCREW-class voltage/clock manipulation) is equally #8. |
| CWE-1332 | Improper Handling of Faults that Lead to Instruction Skips | #8 | Allowed | Induced faults cause the processor to skip instructions; the fault is a physical perturbation. Per R-SUBSTRATE the physical-layer property is itself the exploited generic vulnerability, not merely the readout channel: applying the removal test, if the physical property behaved ideally no flaw would remain. Confirmed #8 in the 2026-08-07 R-SUBSTRATE re-audit. Note that attacker proximity is not the criterion — software-triggered exploitation of a physical property (Rowhammer, CLKSCREW-class voltage/clock manipulation) is equally #8. |
| CWE-1334 | Unauthorized Error Injection Can Degrade Hardware Redundancy | #8 | Allowed | Error injection perturbs hardware redundancy mechanisms by inducing physical fault conditions. Per R-SUBSTRATE the physical-layer property is itself the exploited generic vulnerability, not merely the readout channel: applying the removal test, if the physical property behaved ideally no flaw would remain. Confirmed #8 in the 2026-08-07 R-SUBSTRATE re-audit. Note that attacker proximity is not the criterion — software-triggered exploitation of a physical property (Rowhammer, CLKSCREW-class voltage/clock manipulation) is equally #8. |
| CWE-1338 | Improper Protections Against Hardware Overheating | #8 | Allowed | Thermal conditions outside the safe envelope are exploited to induce misbehaviour. Per R-SUBSTRATE the physical-layer property is itself the exploited generic vulnerability, not merely the readout channel: applying the removal test, if the physical property behaved ideally no flaw would remain. Confirmed #8 in the 2026-08-07 R-SUBSTRATE re-audit. Note that attacker proximity is not the criterion — software-triggered exploitation of a physical property (Rowhammer, CLKSCREW-class voltage/clock manipulation) is equally #8. |
| CWE-1351 | Improper Handling of Hardware Behavior in Exceptionally Cold Environments | #8 | Allowed | Behaviour outside the rated temperature range is a physical characteristic of the device. Per R-SUBSTRATE the physical-layer property is itself the exploited generic vulnerability, not merely the readout channel: applying the removal test, if the physical property behaved ideally no flaw would remain. Confirmed #8 in the 2026-08-07 R-SUBSTRATE re-audit. Note that attacker proximity is not the criterion — software-triggered exploitation of a physical property (Rowhammer, CLKSCREW-class voltage/clock manipulation) is equally #8. |
| CWE-1384 | Improper Handling of Physical or Environmental Conditions | #8 | Allowed | The weakness is mishandling of physical and environmental operating conditions generally. Per R-SUBSTRATE the physical-layer property is itself the exploited generic vulnerability, not merely the readout channel: applying the removal test, if the physical property behaved ideally no flaw would remain. Confirmed #8 in the 2026-08-07 R-SUBSTRATE re-audit. Note that attacker proximity is not the criterion — software-triggered exploitation of a physical property (Rowhammer, CLKSCREW-class voltage/clock manipulation) is equally #8. |
