ADR 0001: VRP Portable Attestations v0.1
Status: Accepted Date: 2026-05-31 (proposed) · 2026-07-22 (accepted)
Context
Vacation Rental Protocol (VRP) v0.1 proves that a concrete stay offer is real by verifying host-domain discovery metadata, host-domain signing keys, a fresh signed offer, exact price, availability, and the direct booking URL.
VRP also needs a way for agents and clients to understand portable trust history without making HemmaBo, or any other operator, the central issuer, registry, scorer, booking intermediary, OTA, marketplace, or trust authority.
The extension must preserve the core VRP model:
- The host-owned domain remains the source of truth for host-domain facts.
- Verification is cryptographic and decentralized, not reputation scoring.
- HemmaBo may publish a reference implementation and help author the standard, but does not own truth for VRP attestations.
- The existing VRP domain,
vacationrentalprotocol.com, is the standards home. No new domain is introduced.
Decision
VRP will define Portable Attestations v0.1 as an open, document-only extension to the core VRP v0.1 specification.
Portable attestations v0.1 will use the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 and will be secured with VC JOSE/COSE as compact JWS for the v0.1 JSON profile. The protected JWS header for v0.1 credentials MUST include:
{
"typ": "vc+jwt",
"alg": "EdDSA",
"kid": "did:web:example-host.invalid#attestations-ed25519-2026-05"
}
The compact JWS envelope is the signature. Credential JSON MUST NOT include its own signature or proof member.
The JWS payload MUST use the registered JWT iat claim for signing time. VRP will not define an issuedAt credential property. Credential data validity MUST use validFrom and validUntil.
The credential issuer for v0.1 host attestations is the host-domain DID, such as did:web:villaakerlyckan.se. Offer signing keys and attestation signing keys share the same host-domain trust root through the host domain and DID, but they MAY use different key identifiers and different private keys. The standard MUST NOT require the same private key for signed offers and attestations.
VRP-specific terms will be defined in a VRP JSON-LD context at:
https://vacationrentalprotocol.com/contexts/v1
Portable Attestations v0.1 will define only privacy-minimized, node-, policy-, and payment-path-oriented credential types:
VRPHostDomainCredentialVRPPaymentPathCredentialVRPPolicySnapshotCredentialVRPVerifiedStayCredential, only when it avoids guest identity and exact identifying stay dates
Portable Attestations v0.1 will explicitly exclude:
- guest reviews
- guest outcomes
- guest risk
- guest scores
- guest history
- guest-held review credentials
- guest-held selective disclosure credentials
Guest-held credentials and reviews are deferred to a future v0.2 design, likely using SD-JWT or another selective disclosure mechanism.
For status and revocation, v0.1 will define VRPStatusListEntry instead of claiming W3C BitstringStatusListEntry compatibility. If a future VRP version uses BitstringStatusListEntry, its status list MUST follow the W3C Bitstring Status List format completely.
This PR does not define or add runtime MCP tools. Future tools, if later specified, should use snake_case names such as verify_vrp_attestations and get_vrp_attestation_bundle. Names such as issue_certificate, hemmabo_trust_score, and vrp.attestations.verify are out of scope for this design.
Consequences
Portable attestations can travel with a host node, export, or verification bundle without requiring a HemmaBo-operated registry or scoring service.
Verifiers can validate an attestation cryptographically and decide their own trust policy. VRP does not decide trust scores and does not certify hosts centrally.
The v0.1 status model is simpler than W3C Bitstring Status List and therefore easier to document honestly before a full privacy-preserving bitstring implementation exists. The tradeoff is that v0.1 status checks are less privacy-preserving and less compact than a conforming bitstring status list. Short credential validity windows remain important.
Keeping v0.1 away from guest reviews, guest history, and guest-held identity claims reduces GDPR and re-identification risk while leaving room for a stronger selective disclosure design in v0.2.
Addendum (2026-07-22, at acceptance)
Between proposal and acceptance, the surrounding pieces this ADR anticipated shipped without contradicting any decision above:
- The receipt envelope (
spec/receipt-v1.md, envelope 1.0) and per-booking transparency-log receipts are live in the reference implementation. Receipts carry no guest identity, consistent with the privacy boundary this ADR sets. - The payment-path direction now has concrete rails a
VRPPaymentPathCredentialcan describe: card rails via platform-orchestrated connected-account charges with the host as merchant of record, the x402 binding draft (spec/profiles/x402-payment-binding-v0.2-draft.md), and AP2 payment mandates. None of these rails require a central issuer or registry, consistent with ADR 0002.
This addendum introduces no normative changes.