ADR 0009: Host-Owned Domain and Offer Binding
Status: Proposed Date: 2026-10-17 (proposed)
Context
VRP's claim is that a stay offer is real because the host's own domain signed it (ADR 0002). On main at 7a05d24, spec/v0.1.md left that claim open in these places:
- "Host-owned" was undefined. §2 required
canonical_domainto "match the host-owned domain being verified" but never said what a host-owned domain is. A name that a platform hands out under its own domain could be read as one. The Public Suffix List shows why a rule must say which part of the list counts: its PRIVATE section (read 2026-10-17, lines 11247–16571) lists domains under which a company hands out names to its customers, site builders and hosting platforms among them (for examplemyshopify.com,wixsite.com,webflow.io,github.io,vercel.app,netlify.app). A rule based on the whole list would accept those customers' names as their own domains. - Brand and closed top-level domains. The ICANN section also holds top-level domains run by one company for its own business.
bookingandhotels(registry operator Booking.com B.V., PSL lines 7305–7307 and 8589–8591),amazonandgoogleare among them. Under such a top-level domain every name belongs to its operator, so a rule based on the ICANN section alone would acceptvilla.booking. ICANN's gTLD list (https://www.icann.org/resources/registries/gtlds/v2/gtlds.json, read 2026-10-17) marks 369 brand top-level domains with"specification13": true,amazonandgoogleamong them, but notbookingorhotels. ICANN publishes no single machine-readable list of the other closed top-level domains; their Code of Conduct exemptions are separate documents per domain. - The booking URL could leave the node. §5.1 allowed
direct_booking_urlon "a subdomain of that registrable domain" (since 2026-06-08,ce91e25). Whencanonical_domainis itself a name under a shared domain, its registrable domain is the platform's, so every other customer's name passed. A separate clause named one operator and stopped that one case only. Userinfo and a non-default port were not addressed. - The node's own URLs were not bound.
jwks_urlandverified_stay_offer_endpointhad to "point to the host-domain" resource, a phrase with no test, and nothing said what "fetched from" means when a fetch is redirected. - The offer was not bound to its domain. §2 bound the discovery document to the fetched domain, and §5.1 bound the booking URL to the offer's *own*
canonical_domain, but no rule bound the signed offer to the domain it was fetched from. The node at one domain could sign an offer naming another domain, with a booking URL on that other domain; fetched from the signing node, it met all eleven conditions of §7, and an agent could present it as the other domain's official offer. - §7 had no keywords. It said "may quote … only when". That is normative text in plain English (RFC 8174 §2), but §1.1 now declares BCP 14 and the conditions are clearer in capitals.
- The site verifiers (
verify.html,verify-receipt.html) checked none of the domain rules, so an offer or a receipt from a platform-issued name could be shown as verified there.verify.htmlnever read the discovery document, and both pages tried a key other than the one named when the JWS header carried nokid(verify.htmlalso when thekidwas unknown).
The IETF draft ietf/draft-abbas-vrp-offer-verification-00 has the same wording (lines 173, 213 and 453 of the .txt).
Decision
D1. Host-owned domain (§2). canonical_domain MUST (1) be lowercase ASCII, with internationalized labels in A-label form and no trailing dot; (2) equal its own registrable domain as computed by the Public Suffix List algorithm using only the ICANN section, each rule compared in A-label form, with the default rule * where no ICANN rule matches; and (3) not be under a brand or closed top-level domain: one marked "specification13": true in ICANN's gTLD list, or one named in §2, which today names booking and hotels. That list changes only by ADR. The PRIVATE section does not count. A name under a platform, catalog, marketplace, OTA, site builder or operator domain is never a canonical_domain, whoever operates that domain. A verifier that holds no copy of either list treats the node as unknown.
D2. Node URL and fetching (§2). A node URL is an absolute https URL whose host is canonical_domain or www. followed by it, with no userinfo and no port other than the https default. jwks_url and verified_stay_offer_endpoint are node URLs. "Fetched from" is the host of the URL the verifier requested; a verifier follows a redirect only to a node URL and treats anything else as unknown.
D3. Offer binding (§7). The discovery document's canonical_domain is the domain it was fetched from, and the signed payload's canonical_domain is the domain the discovery document was fetched from. A valid signature over an offer that names another domain is not that domain's offer.
D4. Booking URL (§5.1). direct_booking_url is a node URL of the offer's canonical_domain. The registrable-domain wording and the clause naming one operator are replaced by this general rule.
D5. §7 in BCP 14 form. "An agent MUST NOT quote … unless all of the following are true", with the binding as its own condition; §8 lists the binding among what must be verified.
D6. Before 1.0 (GOVERNANCE.md §5). GOVERNANCE.md §5 gains a paragraph: while VRP is below 1.0, a correction that closes a security gap may be made within the current draft version without changing protocol_version, with an ADR that states the gap, what stops being accepted, which known nodes are affected and the migration path. Semantic versioning reserves major version zero for initial development ("Anything MAY change at any time", semver 2.0.0 item 4). Under GOVERNANCE.md §12 this amendment is itself substantive, and this record is its ADR.
D7. Conformance vectors and the site verifiers. examples/conformance/host-domain/vectors.v0.1.json (53 cases in five groups, three with real Ed25519 signatures), checked by scripts/verify-host-domain.mjs in npm test. verify.html and verify-receipt.html fetch both lists live from their publishers (both serve Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *) and show "unknown" when a list cannot be fetched. Both pages follow no redirect from a node: a browser cannot see where a redirect points, so a redirect is "unknown". Both select the key only by the kid in the JWS header (§3.1).
verify.html, live offer: D1–D4. It fetches the discovery document from the domain typed, requires itsprotocol,protocol_versionandcanonical_domain, takesjwks_urland the offer endpoint from it only when both are node URLs, and requires the signedcanonical_domainto be that domain and the booking URL to be a node URL.verify.html, pasted offer: D1, D2, D4 and the discovery half of D3, for the domain the offer names. A pasted offer can come from anywhere, so the page never shows one as safe to quote.verify-receipt.html: D1 for the issuer domain. Nothing is fetched from a name that fails D1; when the lists cannot be fetched, the page still checks the signature, and the result is unknown. The receipt'ssubject.nodeandissuer.did, when present, must name the domain that signed it:subject.nodeequal to it,issuer.didadid:webwhose host is it (a leadingwww.ignored on both). Otherwise the receipt is not verified. "Booked directly at" shows the domain that signed it, not the name the receipt gives. Receipt v1 §3 definessubjectandissueras generic objects; these are the field names the page reads today. Which fields identify the node is not decided here.demo.htmlandimplement.htmlalso select the key only bykid.
The pages were checked in a browser during review, with every request answered locally; the cases are listed in the pull request. That browser test is not part of this repository or of npm test.
Consequences
- Version class. D1–D4 change what a verifier accepts, a MAJOR-class change under GOVERNANCE.md §5. It is made within the v0.1 public draft under the new "Before 1.0" paragraph (D6). What stops being accepted: names under another party's domain or under a brand or closed top-level domain; booking, JWKS and offer-endpoint URLs on any other name than the node's domain or
www.under it, with userinfo or with a non-default port; redirects off those names; offers naming another domain than the one fetched. Known nodes affected: none — the known production node, measured 2026-10-17, serves its discovery document,jwks_url, offer endpoint and signed booking URL on its own registered domain (apex), and the site verifier passes it. - Substantive under GOVERNANCE.md §4 and §12: this record, seven days of review and two approvals while two maintainers are active.
- Migration path. A node whose
canonical_domainis a name under another party's domain, or under a brand or closed top-level domain, moves to a domain registered for the host. A booking URL,jwks_urlor offer endpoint on another name, with userinfo or with a non-default port, moves to the node's domain orwww.. Verifiers add the list checks, the node-URL and redirect checks and the binding check.vacationrentalprotocol/vrp-verify(which accepts any name undercanonical_domain) and the reference implementation follow in their own repositories. - Residual gap. A closed top-level domain that ICANN's gTLD list does not mark and §2 does not name is excluded by the rule's wording but not by a program. Adding one to §2 takes an ADR that names its registry operator and the source.
- A verifier now needs two public lists. Both change; the default rule
*keeps a new top-level domain registrable in an older copy of the suffix list. - The IETF draft keeps the old wording until its next revision.
- Neutrality: the rule applies to every operator equally, the operator of any implementation included (ADR 0002). The two named top-level domains are named because the public lists do not mark them, not to single out a company.