Specification · Markdown source · Edit on GitHub · CC0 1.0

VRP Domain Continuity — Specification v0.1

Status: Public draft — proposal for discussion (tracks issue #59). Forward spec in the Receipt v1 §10 sense: nothing here changes what a v0.1 or receipt-v1 verifier MUST do today, and legacy nodes that publish none of the signals below keep exactly today's behavior.

Published: 2026-08-01

Repository: https://github.com/vacationrentalprotocol/vrp-spec

Builds on: Core VRP v0.1 (§3 JWKS, §3.1 key rotation and revocation, §9 three-state verification), Receipt Envelope v1 (§10 key lifecycle K1–K6, D3 transparency-log field), Transparency Log v0.1.

1. Scope and threat model

VRP roots node identity in the host's own domain: did:web, JWKS at a well-known path. Core v0.1 §3.1 covers key events (rotation, revocation). It is silent on domain events:

Consequence for history: once the original JWKS is gone, historical signed offers lose live verifiability. Detection via the transparency log survives — the log is tamper-evident, not immutable, and that distinction is load-bearing here.

2. Continuity statement (registration epoch)

A node SHOULD publish a continuity statement alongside its discovery document:

FieldRequirementDescription
domain_registeredSHOULDRegistration (creation) date of the domain as attested by RDAP/registrar data
epoch_startedMUSTDate this key lineage began operating the domain
genesis_kidMUSTkid of the first key in this lineage (retired keys stay resolvable per K2/K3)
statement_jwsMUSTCompact JWS over the fields above, signed by a key in the current JWKS

The property that makes this useful: a new registrant cannot truthfully extend the previous epoch, because they cannot sign with the prior lineage's keys. An epoch break is therefore detectable by construction — no central authority, no registry, no permission.

3. Verifier guidance (forward spec)

4. Host guidance

Treat the domain as key material:

5. What this does not do

6. Open questions (for discussion in #59)

  1. Should the continuity statement live inside the discovery document or as its own well-known artifact?
  2. What SHOULD a verifier assume when RDAP data is unavailable or the registrar does not expose a creation date?
  3. Minimum guidance for hosts on renewal/expiry as an identity-safety concern — how prescriptive should the spec be, given large-scale link-rot and domain-death data?

7. Neutrality

The spec is vendor-neutral. HemmaBo is a reference implementer, not an approval authority. Any node, on any stack, can publish a continuity statement and any party can evaluate one without permission from anyone.

8. License

Specification text: dedicated to the public domain under CC0 1.0.