VRP Domain Continuity — Specification v0.1
Status: Public draft — proposal for discussion (tracks issue #59). Forward spec in the Receipt v1 §10 sense: nothing here changes what a v0.1 or receipt-v1 verifier MUST do today, and legacy nodes that publish none of the signals below keep exactly today's behavior.
Published: 2026-08-01
Repository: https://github.com/vacationrentalprotocol/vrp-spec
Builds on: Core VRP v0.1 (§3 JWKS, §3.1 key rotation and revocation, §9 three-state verification), Receipt Envelope v1 (§10 key lifecycle K1–K6, D3 transparency-log field), Transparency Log v0.1.
1. Scope and threat model
VRP roots node identity in the host's own domain: did:web, JWKS at a well-known path. Core v0.1 §3.1 covers key events (rotation, revocation). It is silent on domain events:
- Expiry / non-renewal. An expired domain is not just a dead link. The next registrant inherits the
did:webidentifier and can publish their own JWKS at the same well-known path — the identifier stays valid while the identity behind it silently changes hands. - Voluntary transfer or sale of the domain to a new operator.
- Registrar-level compromise (hijack). This document detects epoch breaks; it does not prevent registrar attacks.
Consequence for history: once the original JWKS is gone, historical signed offers lose live verifiability. Detection via the transparency log survives — the log is tamper-evident, not immutable, and that distinction is load-bearing here.
2. Continuity statement (registration epoch)
A node SHOULD publish a continuity statement alongside its discovery document:
| Field | Requirement | Description |
|---|---|---|
domain_registered | SHOULD | Registration (creation) date of the domain as attested by RDAP/registrar data |
epoch_started | MUST | Date this key lineage began operating the domain |
genesis_kid | MUST | kid of the first key in this lineage (retired keys stay resolvable per K2/K3) |
statement_jws | MUST | Compact JWS over the fields above, signed by a key in the current JWKS |
The property that makes this useful: a new registrant cannot truthfully extend the previous epoch, because they cannot sign with the prior lineage's keys. An epoch break is therefore detectable by construction — no central authority, no registry, no permission.
3. Verifier guidance (forward spec)
- V1 — registration post-dates the artifact. If the domain's current registration date (RDAP) is later than the timestamp of the artifact being verified, a verifier SHOULD treat live-JWKS verification of that artifact as non-authoritative and fall back to transparency-log inclusion (D3, K4). In v0.1 §9 terms the honest outcome is the middle state — unverifiable live, log-consistent — never a silent pass.
- V2 — epoch mismatch. If the artifact predates
epoch_startedof the current continuity statement, same downgrade as V1. - V3 — no signals published. Verifier behavior is exactly today's. This document adds no new failure modes for legacy nodes.
4. Host guidance
Treat the domain as key material:
- Multi-year registration and auto-renew; monitor expiry independently of the registrar's own reminders.
- Registrar transfer lock.
- Anchor receipts in the transparency log (K4) so the history of what the node signed outlives the domain itself.
- On a planned transfer that is meant to *preserve* identity (same operator, new registrar), keep the JWKS and continuity statement intact across the move; the epoch does not break because the lineage keeps signing.
5. What this does not do
- No central continuity authority and no domain revocation list — consistent with receipt-v1 neutrality (D8).
- No protection against a registrar-level attacker who also steals the node's signing keys; this is detection of identity discontinuity, not prevention of infrastructure compromise.
- No claim of immutability anywhere: the transparency log is tamper-evident, and public copy about this mechanism MUST keep that word.
6. Open questions (for discussion in #59)
- Should the continuity statement live inside the discovery document or as its own well-known artifact?
- What SHOULD a verifier assume when RDAP data is unavailable or the registrar does not expose a creation date?
- Minimum guidance for hosts on renewal/expiry as an identity-safety concern — how prescriptive should the spec be, given large-scale link-rot and domain-death data?
7. Neutrality
The spec is vendor-neutral. HemmaBo is a reference implementer, not an approval authority. Any node, on any stack, can publish a continuity statement and any party can evaluate one without permission from anyone.
8. License
Specification text: dedicated to the public domain under CC0 1.0.