VRP Node Seal — Specification v0.1
Status: Public draft — the pattern is named and its bytes are fixed; this version requires no new runtime behavior from agents or payment rails (see §1 and §9).
Published: 2026-07-24
Repository: https://github.com/vacationrentalprotocol/vrp-spec
Builds on: Core VRP v0.1 (did:web node identity, signed offers), Well-Known URI v0.1 (discovery layout), Booking Proof Chain v0.1 (supersession semantics §7).
1. Scope
This document names and normatively defines the Node Seal: a two-directional, independently verifiable binding between a node's domain identity and its payment-receiving key.
The gap it closes: agentic payment ecosystems index and pay sellers by bare payment address, with no proof of who an address belongs to. The funded agent-payment stack verifies the buyer; nothing verifies that the address an agent is about to pay belongs to the domain whose offer the agent just read. The seal is the seller-side answer, spoken in the payment ecosystem's own dialect:
The promise comes from the same key that receives the money.
The node's Ed25519 offer signature says *the domain promises*. The seal says *the payment recipient promises*. A verifier that checks both has closed the loop: mouth and hand are the same party.
This version defines the seal artifact, its location, its verification, and its lifecycle. It deliberately requires nothing new at runtime: it fixes the bytes so that when a consuming rail or indexer exists, conforming nodes already agree on what to publish and verifiers on what to check.
2. References
- DIF Well-Known DID Configuration (informative) — "Domain Linkage": the same bidirectional domain-⇄-key architecture, here applied to a payment key.
- did:pkh (informative, draft) — payment accounts as DID subjects.
- ERC-8004 (informative) — nearest active neighbor (on-chain agent identity registry). The seal is off-chain and requires no transaction.
- EIP-191 —
personal_signmessage signing. CAIP-10 — account identifiers. - RFC 8615 (well-known URIs), RFC 6234 (SHA-256).
- UCP seller key publication (
/.well-known/ucp, ES256 + JCS) — convergent seller-side pattern; see §8.
3. The seal artifact (normative)
A seal is a JSON document served from the node's own canonical origin over https, with media type application/json, at:
/.well-known/vrp/node-seal/v0.1/seal.json
It MUST NOT be served via a cross-origin redirect (the node's apex origin is the trust root, exactly as for did:web).
{
"vrp_node_seal": "0.1",
"domain": "node.example",
"did": "did:web:node.example",
"payment_address": "eip155:1:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
"statement": "VRP Node Seal v0.1\ndomain: node.example\ndid: did:web:node.example\npayment_address: eip155:1:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001\nissued_at: 2026-07-24T00:00:00Z",
"signature": "0x…",
"issued_at": "2026-07-24T00:00:00Z",
"supersedes": null
}
*(Example values; the signature shown is a placeholder and does not verify.)*
3.1 Statement bytes
The statement is the exact byte sequence signed. It is reconstructed from the document's own fields as five lines joined by single \n (LF), no trailing newline, UTF-8:
VRP Node Seal v0.1
domain: <domain>
did: <did>
payment_address: <payment_address>
issued_at: <issued_at>
Field values MUST match the JSON fields byte-for-byte. A verifier MUST reconstruct the statement from the fields and compare it to statement; any difference is a verification failure. This is the same no-re-canonicalization discipline as the rest of VRP: what is verified is the exact bytes, never a re-serialization.
3.2 Signature
signature is an [EIP-191] personal_sign signature over the statement bytes. The address recovered from the signature MUST equal the account component of payment_address. Signing is an offline operation: the address needs no on-chain history, no funds, and no transaction.
3.3 The two directions
Both directions MUST hold; either alone is not a seal:
- Domain → key. The document is served from the node's canonical origin under TLS — the same trust root
did:webuses. Serving it *is* the domain's declaration of the address. - Key → domain. The payment key signs the statement naming the domain and DID. Any holder of standard EVM tooling can recover the signer and check it — without knowing anything about
did:web.
3.4 Consistency with other surfaces
If the node advertises an agent-payable address on any other machine surface for the same rail (payment configuration, checkout metadata), that address MUST equal payment_address. One seal document binds one address; multiple simultaneous addresses are out of scope for v0.1.
4. Verification (normative)
A verifier:
- fetches the seal from the node's canonical origin (
https, no cross-origin redirect); - reconstructs the statement bytes from the JSON fields (§3.1) and byte-compares with
statement; - recovers the signer from
signatureover the statement bytes (§3.2) and compares withpayment_address; - resolves
/.well-known/did.jsonon the same origin and checks thatdidmatches; - where another surface advertises a payment address (§3.4), checks that it equals the sealed one.
Any mismatch at any step is a seal failure. Freshness: the seal currently served is the current seal; verifiers MUST NOT rely on cached seals beyond ordinary HTTP cache semantics.
5. Lifecycle: rotation, supersession, revocation (normative)
Key lifecycle is the expensive part of any signing scheme — it is specified here from the start, not retrofitted.
issued_atis REQUIRED.- Rotation / address change: publish a new seal whose
supersedesis"sha256:" + lowercase-hex(SHA-256(superseded statement bytes))— the same recomputable-reference discipline as the Booking Proof Chain. Supersession chains follow Booking Proof Chain v0.1 §7: forks and cycles are verification failures. - Revocation without replacement: the node serves HTTP 410 Gone at the seal path. Verifiers MUST treat 410 as an explicit revocation (distinct from 404, which means no seal was published).
- Compromised payment key: the node MUST stop advertising the address on all surfaces and MUST revoke or supersede the seal. The consistency check (§3.4) then fails closed for verifiers. The seal binds identity; it cannot recover funds — key custody is out of scope.
- Nodes SHOULD re-issue the seal at least every 12 months as a freshness signal, and MUST re-issue on any field change.
6. Never a gate (normative)
The seal is seller-side evidence for payment-side verifiers — it points from the node outward, never back at agents:
- A node MUST NOT condition content, offers, availability, or booking flows on any agent presenting seal-related material.
- Verifying the seal is always optional; a node MUST serve all agents identically whether or not they verify anything.
- Verifiers SHOULD NOT interpret the absence of a seal as a negative signal about a node: v0.1 is optional and newly published.
*(Rationale, informative: most production agents do not sign their requests. Any gate built on agent-side cryptography excludes the very consumers this specification serves.)*
7. Non-goals (normative)
- No chain, no mainnet, no funds. Nothing here requires an on-chain transaction or an address that has ever transacted.
- Not a badge. The seal proves a key–domain binding — never quality, legitimacy of the business, or any property of the stay.
- No new confirmation dialect. Booking Proof Chain v0.1 §6 stands unchanged.
- No payment semantics. Rails and their guarantees are out of scope.
- No central registry. A seal lives in exactly one place: the node's own origin. There is nothing to submit and nobody to ask.
8. Dialect interoperability (informative)
EIP-191 personal_sign is chosen because it is the dialect the agentic payment ecosystems already parse natively. Where seller-side signing exists elsewhere in the wild, the dialect is ES256 + JCS (UCP publishes seller signing_keys under /.well-known/ucp on the seller's own domain; AP2 merchant JWTs are ES256). The binding semantics are identical; a future profile MAY express the same statement as an ES256/JCS-signed JWS for those consumers. Verifiers compare bindings, never encodings. Nothing in this version changes any existing VRP signature: offers and receipts remain Ed25519 compact JWS.
9. Deployment status (informative)
As of publication, no payment rail or indexer verifies domain↔address bindings — sellers are indexed by bare payTo. This specification therefore ships as fixed ground rather than as a runtime requirement: nodes MAY publish seals today; the reference implementation will publish its seal alongside the first consuming rail or indexer.
Reserved for future versions: *sealed statements* — statements about specific offers or commitments, signed by the same payment key in the same dialect, so that the receiving key can speak about what it is receiving payment *for*. The name and the concept are reserved here; the format is deliberately not fixed in v0.1.
10. Conformance
A node conforms to Node Seal v0.1 if:
- its seal is served at the defined path from its canonical origin (§3);
- the statement reconstructs byte-exactly from the document fields (§3.1);
- the signature recovers to the sealed address (§3.2);
didmatches the origin's/.well-known/did.json(§4);- every agent-payable address it advertises equals the sealed address (§3.4);
- rotation, supersession, and revocation follow §5;
- it gates nothing on the seal (§6).
11. Neutrality
The spec is vendor-neutral. HemmaBo is a reference implementer, not an approval authority. Any node, on any stack, can publish and any party can verify a Node Seal without permission from anyone.
12. License
Specification text: dedicated to the public domain under CC0 1.0.