VRP Booking Proof Chain — Specification v0.1
Status: Public draft
Published: 2026-07-23
Repository: https://github.com/vacationrentalprotocol/vrp-spec
Builds on: Core VRP v0.1 (signed verified stay offers), Receipt Envelope v1 (issuance wrapper §14, verbatim delivery §15, verifier walk-through §16), Transparency Log v0.1 (leaf hashing rule §4.1).
1. Scope
This document names and normatively defines the Booking Proof Chain: the single derivation family that binds a booking's offer, payment, receipt, and confirmation into one recomputable chain. Every link is the same primitive —
SHA-256 over the exact bytes of a node-signed compact-JWS artifact.
The chain gives a booking confirmation the property this specification calls identifier-is-proof: the string a guest or agent holds as their confirmation is not a label somebody assigned — it is a value anybody can recompute from the signed artifact and check against public state, with no trusted party, no central registry, and no judge.
This specification defines no new runtime endpoints and no new string dialect (see §6). It names, fixes, and makes citable a derivation that conforming implementations already produce.
2. References
- VRP Receipt Envelope v1 — the receipt artifact and its delivery rules.
- VRP Transparency Log v0.1 — append-only anchoring of artifact hashes.
- EIP-3009 (informative) —
transferWithAuthorizationnonces, used by the x402 payment-binding profile in §4. - RFC 7515 (JWS), RFC 6234 (SHA-256).
3. The chain (normative)
The Booking Proof Chain consists of three links. All hashes are SHA-256 over the exact bytes of the compact-JWS string as issued — never over re-serialized or re-canonicalized JSON (Receipt Envelope v1 §7 rule applies chain-wide).
3.1 Link 1 — Offer hash (offer_hash)
offer_hash = SHA-256(offer compact-JWS bytes)
The verified stay offer is a node-signed compact JWS (Core VRP v0.1). Its hash is the chain's root: it commits to the exact promised property, dates, party size, and price.
3.2 Link 2 — Payment binding (rail profiles)
A payment is chain-bound when the settlement carries offer_hash in a slot the rail preserves. Rail profiles:
- x402 / EIP-3009 profile: the 32-byte
nonceoftransferWithAuthorizationequalsoffer_hash. Because consumed nonces are public on-chain state (authorizationState(authorizer, nonce)and the indexedAuthorizationUsedevent), anyone who recomputesoffer_hashfrom the offer JWS can confirm, permissionlessly, that exactly that offer was paid and by which address. *(Informative note: EIP-3009 verifiers treat the nonce as opaque; the binding is recomputable by any party told this rule, and enforced by uniqueness — a given offer can be paid this way at most once per payer.)* - Custodial rails (card / account-to-account): the rail itself carries no artifact binding. A conforming node MUST retain the association between the settlement identifier and
offer_hashin its booking records, and SHOULD carryoffer_hash(full or truncated per §5) in any merchant-controlled reference or metadata slot the rail preserves.
*(Interoperability note, informative: Mastercard/Google "Verifiable Intent" independently binds payment mandates via transaction_id = B64U(SHA-256(checkout_jwt)) — hash-of-a-merchant-signed-artifact is the converging cross-industry pattern. The digest value is identical; only the text encoding differs — see §5.)*
3.3 Link 3 — Receipt artifact hash: the confirmation reference
artifact_hash = "sha256:" + lowercase-hex( SHA-256(receipt wrapper-JWS bytes) )
The receipt (Receipt Envelope v1 §14) is the node-signed record of the promise a confirmed booking settles. Its artifact hash is simultaneously:
- the transparency-log leaf (Transparency Log v0.1 §4.1),
- the inclusion-proof lookup key (
…/proof?hash=<artifact_hash>), and - the booking confirmation reference — the chain's public face.
A booking confirmation under this specification is Link 3: a value recomputable by any holder of the receipt JWS, resolvable against the public log, and impossible to fabricate for a booking that does not exist.
4. Identifier-is-proof (normative)
Derived proof strings are only consumed in practice when verification is a side effect of ordinary use. Conforming implementations therefore:
- MUST use
artifact_hashas the functional lookup key for the receipt's inclusion proof on the issuing node's log surfaces; - MUST deliver the full receipt wrapper-JWS to the booking's holder byte-verbatim (Receipt Envelope v1 §15) — a bare hash proves nothing without the retained artifact it commits to;
- MUST NOT present a booking as chain-confirmed on the strength of a hash-shaped string alone: verification is (a) recompute the hash from the retained JWS, (b) verify the JWS against the node's published keys, (c) check log inclusion;
- SHOULD carry the confirmation reference wherever the booking is represented to agents (status responses, machine-readable confirmation surfaces), so that the string a consumer encounters is always the recomputable one.
5. Encodings and truncation (normative)
- Canonical display form:
sha256:+ lowercase hex (64 hex chars). - The same digest MAY be carried base64url-encoded where a carrier requires it. Verifiers MUST compare digest bytes, never string forms across encodings.
- Carriers with length limits (payment references, human-facing codes) MAY carry a truncated digest plus an error-detection code appropriate to the carrier. A truncated value is a *locator*, not a proof: verification is always recompute-then-compare against the full digest.
6. Non-goals (normative)
- No new confirmation dialect. This specification deliberately defines no wallet-address-shaped, branded, or otherwise novel confirmation format. No consumer parses such a format today, and address-shaped strings invite misdirected funds. The chain's strings are plain SHA-256 digests riding in existing carriers (reservation-number fields, payment references, URLs) unchanged.
- No settlement semantics. Payment rails and their guarantees are out of scope (Core VRP v0.1 §5.2 reservation stands); §3.2 defines only how a settlement, once made, is bound to the chain.
- No central verifier. Anyone may verify; nobody must be asked.
7. Supersession (normative)
Lodging bookings mutate: reschedules, renegotiated totals, cancellations. The chain handles mutation by superseding receipts, never by editing:
- A receipt issued because a prior receipt's promise changed SHOULD include
supersedes: "<artifact_hash of the prior receipt>"at the envelope's top level. - Both receipts remain anchored in the log. The superseded receipt remains valid evidence of the promise that held before the change; the superseding receipt states the promise that holds now.
- The current confirmation reference for a booking is the artifact hash of its latest unsuperseded receipt. Verifiers resolving a chain of
supersedeslinks MUST treat a cycle or a fork (two unsuperseded receipts claiming the same predecessor) as a verification failure. - A cancellation is a superseding receipt whose subject records the cancelled state; it does not remove history.
*(Receipts issued before this specification carry no supersedes field and are unaffected.)*
8. Verifier walk-through (informative)
An agent holding a confirmation reference and receipt JWS for a booking:
- Recompute
artifact_hashfrom the exact receipt-JWS bytes; compare with the reference held. - Verify the wrapper JWS and inner attestations against the node's published keys (
/.well-known/jwks.json, resolvable via the node'sdid:webdocument). - Fetch the inclusion proof for
artifact_hashfrom the log; verify against a signed tree head. - If the receipt carries
supersedes, walk to the referenced hash to reconstruct the booking's history; confirm no fork. - Where the payment used the x402 profile: recompute
offer_hashfrom the offer JWS and checkauthorizationState(payer, offer_hash)on-chain.
At no step is any party asked to vouch. Every step is recomputation against published, signed, or on-chain state.
9. Conformance
A node conforms to Booking Proof Chain v0.1 if:
- its offers and receipts are node-signed compact JWS artifacts whose hashes follow §3;
- receipt artifact hashes are log-anchored and serve as inclusion-proof lookup keys (§4);
- receipt delivery is byte-verbatim to the holder (§4);
- superseding receipts, where issued, follow §7;
- it introduces no alternative confirmation dialect presented as chain-verified (§6).
10. Neutrality
The spec is vendor-neutral. HemmaBo is a reference implementer, not an approval authority. Any node, on any stack, can produce and any party can verify a Booking Proof Chain without permission from anyone.
11. License
Specification text: dedicated to the public domain under CC0 1.0.