Specification · Markdown source · Edit on GitHub · CC0 1.0

VRP Booking Proof Chain — Specification v0.1

Status: Public draft

Published: 2026-07-23

Repository: https://github.com/vacationrentalprotocol/vrp-spec

Builds on: Core VRP v0.1 (signed verified stay offers), Receipt Envelope v1 (issuance wrapper §14, verbatim delivery §15, verifier walk-through §16), Transparency Log v0.1 (leaf hashing rule §4.1).

1. Scope

This document names and normatively defines the Booking Proof Chain: the single derivation family that binds a booking's offer, payment, receipt, and confirmation into one recomputable chain. Every link is the same primitive —

SHA-256 over the exact bytes of a node-signed compact-JWS artifact.

The chain gives a booking confirmation the property this specification calls identifier-is-proof: the string a guest or agent holds as their confirmation is not a label somebody assigned — it is a value anybody can recompute from the signed artifact and check against public state, with no trusted party, no central registry, and no judge.

This specification defines no new runtime endpoints and no new string dialect (see §6). It names, fixes, and makes citable a derivation that conforming implementations already produce.

2. References

3. The chain (normative)

The Booking Proof Chain consists of three links. All hashes are SHA-256 over the exact bytes of the compact-JWS string as issued — never over re-serialized or re-canonicalized JSON (Receipt Envelope v1 §7 rule applies chain-wide).

offer_hash = SHA-256(offer compact-JWS bytes)

The verified stay offer is a node-signed compact JWS (Core VRP v0.1). Its hash is the chain's root: it commits to the exact promised property, dates, party size, and price.

A payment is chain-bound when the settlement carries offer_hash in a slot the rail preserves. Rail profiles:

*(Interoperability note, informative: Mastercard/Google "Verifiable Intent" independently binds payment mandates via transaction_id = B64U(SHA-256(checkout_jwt)) — hash-of-a-merchant-signed-artifact is the converging cross-industry pattern. The digest value is identical; only the text encoding differs — see §5.)*

artifact_hash = "sha256:" + lowercase-hex( SHA-256(receipt wrapper-JWS bytes) )

The receipt (Receipt Envelope v1 §14) is the node-signed record of the promise a confirmed booking settles. Its artifact hash is simultaneously:

  1. the transparency-log leaf (Transparency Log v0.1 §4.1),
  2. the inclusion-proof lookup key (…/proof?hash=<artifact_hash>), and
  3. the booking confirmation reference — the chain's public face.

A booking confirmation under this specification is Link 3: a value recomputable by any holder of the receipt JWS, resolvable against the public log, and impossible to fabricate for a booking that does not exist.

4. Identifier-is-proof (normative)

Derived proof strings are only consumed in practice when verification is a side effect of ordinary use. Conforming implementations therefore:

5. Encodings and truncation (normative)

6. Non-goals (normative)

7. Supersession (normative)

Lodging bookings mutate: reschedules, renegotiated totals, cancellations. The chain handles mutation by superseding receipts, never by editing:

*(Receipts issued before this specification carry no supersedes field and are unaffected.)*

8. Verifier walk-through (informative)

An agent holding a confirmation reference and receipt JWS for a booking:

  1. Recompute artifact_hash from the exact receipt-JWS bytes; compare with the reference held.
  2. Verify the wrapper JWS and inner attestations against the node's published keys (/.well-known/jwks.json, resolvable via the node's did:web document).
  3. Fetch the inclusion proof for artifact_hash from the log; verify against a signed tree head.
  4. If the receipt carries supersedes, walk to the referenced hash to reconstruct the booking's history; confirm no fork.
  5. Where the payment used the x402 profile: recompute offer_hash from the offer JWS and check authorizationState(payer, offer_hash) on-chain.

At no step is any party asked to vouch. Every step is recomputation against published, signed, or on-chain state.

9. Conformance

A node conforms to Booking Proof Chain v0.1 if:

  1. its offers and receipts are node-signed compact JWS artifacts whose hashes follow §3;
  2. receipt artifact hashes are log-anchored and serve as inclusion-proof lookup keys (§4);
  3. receipt delivery is byte-verbatim to the holder (§4);
  4. superseding receipts, where issued, follow §7;
  5. it introduces no alternative confirmation dialect presented as chain-verified (§6).

10. Neutrality

The spec is vendor-neutral. HemmaBo is a reference implementer, not an approval authority. Any node, on any stack, can produce and any party can verify a Booking Proof Chain without permission from anyone.

11. License

Specification text: dedicated to the public domain under CC0 1.0.