---
type: Concept
bundle: vedanta-epistemology
bundle_version: "0.3.2"
id: mithya
title: "Mithyā — Dependent Existence (Neither Real Nor Non-Existent)"
iast: "mithyā"
devanagari: "मिथ्या"
description: "Dependent Existence (Neither Real Nor Non-Existent). Not false, not illusory."
reception_note: "Present mithya as ontological dependency (neither absolutely real nor unreal), not as 'false' or 'illusion'; the illusion gloss is a secondary node of the Schopenhauer maya chain documented in the Error Genealogy."
darshana:
  - Advaita Vedānta
school_scope: "Advaita Vedānta (the ontological category is Advaita-specific; the three-valued ontology — sat/mithyā/asat — is Śaṅkara's framework; Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita reject mithyātva of the world entirely)"
text_source: "Vivekacūḍāmaṇi vv.20–21 (Śaṅkara); Pañcadaśī 1.7 (Vidyāraṇya); Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya 2.1.14 (Śaṅkara — on the world as anirvacanīya)"
tags:
  - advaita-vedanta
  - ontology
  - three-levels-of-reality
  - sat-asat
  - bhadha
  - maya
  - tier-2
  - critical
not:
  - term: "false"
    why: "'false' applies to propositions (a claim is false if it does not correspond to fact); mithyā applies to the ontological status of an entity — the world is not a false proposition but a real experience whose ultimate ground is Brahman; \"the world is false\" is a mistranslation of *jagat mithyā* that Śaṅkara himself would reject"
    instead: "Keep Dependent Existence untranslated; do not substitute the English term."
  - term: "illusory"
    why: "'illusory' implies the experience feels unreal or deceptive (a hallucination, a mirage); the vyāvahārika world of ordinary experience does not feel unreal — it functions fully, causes real pain and pleasure, and supports valid empirical knowledge; its mithyātva is a philosophical claim about ontological dependency, not a phenomenological claim that it appears thin or uncertain"
  - term: "non-existent"
    why: "the non-existent (*asat*) is precisely what mithyā is NOT; the non-existent cannot be experienced at all (Śaṅkara: you cannot cognize a sky-lotus or the horn of a hare); the world is thoroughly experienced and is therefore not asat; mithyā occupies the third position between sat and asat"
  - term: "māyā"
    why: "māyā is the power (śakti) of Brahman by which the world appears; mithyā is the ontological status of what that power produces; māyā is the causal mechanism, mithyā is the effect's status; conflating them makes māyā do the work that belongs to the Advaita analysis of the world's ontological standing"
  - term: "unreal"
    why: "'unreal' in English collapses the distinction between asat (non-existent) and mithyā (dependently real); the world is not unreal in the sense of being non-existent; it is mithyā in the sense of being dependent on Brahman for its existence and subject to sublation by brahma-jñāna"
  - term: "fictional"
    why: "fiction is a human construction with no claim to independent existence; the vyāvahārika world is not constructed by human cognition (it precedes any individual's cognition and is intersubjectively shared); its mithyātva is not a function of being constructed but of being dependent on its substratum (Brahman)"
  - term: "śūnya / emptiness"
    why: "Buddhist śūnyatā asserts that phenomena lack inherent existence (svabhāva) — they are dependently originated but have no permanent nature; Advaita's mithyā asserts dependent existence on Brahman, a positive conscious ground; the Advaita critique of Buddhist śūnyavāda is precisely that śūnya leaves no positive reality (no adhiṣṭhāna) — for Advaita, Brahman is the adhiṣṭhāna on which all mithyā rests"
related:
  - /concepts/adhyasa.md
  - /concepts/vyavaharika.md
  - /concepts/paramarthika.md
  - /concepts/pratibhasika.md
  - /concepts/vivartavada.md
  - /concepts/badha-badhita.md
  - /concepts/pramana.md
  - /concepts/aparoksha-anubhuti.md
  - /concepts/avidya.md
  - /concepts/jnana.md
  - /concepts/parinamavada.md
  - /concepts/prameya.md
  - /concepts/pratyaksha.md
timestamp: "2026-06-20"
okf_version: "0.2"
license: "CC BY-SA 4.0"
---

# Mithyā — मिथ्या

**Not:** false, illusory, non-existent, māyā, unreal, fictional, śūnya / emptiness

Mithyā is the ontological status of that which is neither absolutely real (*sat*) nor absolutely non-existent (*asat*) — dependent existence, contingent on its substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*), and subject to sublation (*bādha*) by liberating knowledge. In Advaita Vedānta, the world (*jagat*), the empirical self (*jīva*), and all objects of ordinary experience have mithyā status — they are genuinely experienced, they support valid empirical knowledge, and they cause real pain and pleasure; but they have no existence independent of Brahman and are sublated when Brahman is directly known.

The most cited Advaita formula (Vivekacūḍāmaṇi v.20):

> *brahma satyaṃ jagat mithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ*
> Brahman is real (*satya*); the world is mithyā; the jīva is Brahman itself, nothing else.

This is not the claim that the world is false, non-existent, or hallucinatory. It is the claim that the world's existence is of a different ontological order than Brahman's — dependent rather than self-subsistent, sublatable rather than uncancellable.

## Etymology

From Sanskrit *mithyā* — with the sense of 'wrongly,' 'falsely,' 'deceptively' — but in technical Advaita usage, the term is given a precise ontological meaning that overrides its ordinary linguistic connotation of 'falsehood.' The technical meaning is fixed by definition: mithyā = *sad-asadbhyāṃ anirvacanīya* — that which is indescribable as either purely existent (*sat*) or purely non-existent (*asat*); or equivalently: that which is *bādhyatva-dharma* — that which has the property of being sublatable.

The ordinary meaning of *mithyā* as 'falsely' or 'incorrectly' is the source of the most common mistranslation (*mithyā* = "false/illusory"). Śaṅkara's technical usage transforms this into a precise ontological category that his opponents must engage with on its own terms, not on the basis of the word's everyday usage.

## The Three-Valued Advaita Ontology

Advaita distinguishes three ontological levels (*trikāla-abadhitatva* = being uncancellable across three times / *bādhyatva* = being sublatable):

### Pāramārthika — Absolutely Real
Brahman (pure consciousness, being, bliss — *saccidānanda*) is absolutely real. It is *trikālābādhita* — uncancellable at all three times (past, present, future). There is no cognition that could sublate Brahman. Brahman's existence does not depend on any other entity; it is *svayaṃprakāśa* (self-luminous) and *svasiddha* (self-established).

### Mithyā — Dependently Real (the intermediate status)
The world, the jīva, the objects of ordinary experience — all have mithyā status. They are real within the frame of empirical experience (*vyāvahārika* = conventional/transactional). They are sublated (*bādhita*) upon brahma-jñāna (direct realization of Brahman). Their existence is dependent on Brahman as their substratum — they borrow existence from Brahman in the way that the superimposed snake borrows existence from the rope.

Three sub-varieties of mithyā correspond to the two lower ontological levels:
- **Vyāvahārika** (empirically real): the world as experienced in waking state — trees, bodies, minds, social relations; real and consistent for all practical purposes; sublated only at liberation (see vyavaharika.md)
- **Prātibhāsika** (apparently real): the snake in the rope, silver in nacre, a second moon due to double vision; real only from a particular deluded standpoint; sublated immediately upon corrective cognition (see pratibhasika.md)

Both vyāvahārika and prātibhāsika are mithyā — but they differ in the scope and trigger of their sublation.

### Asat — Absolutely Non-Existent
The sky-lotus (*kha-puṣpa*), the horn of a hare (*śaśaśr̥ṅga*), the son of a barren woman (*vandhyā-putra*) — these are *asat*, absolutely non-existent. They cannot be experienced even in principle; no valid cognition produces them. The world is explicitly *not* asat — it is thoroughly experienced by all beings and is therefore not in this category.

## The Defining Criterion: Bādhyatva

The technical criterion for mithyā in Advaita is *bādhyatva* — the property of being sublatable, the susceptibility to being cancelled by a subsequent cognition of the same locus (*same-substratum-same-time* sublation):

> **Mithyā** = that which is the correlate of sublation with a non-different locus (*sādhiṣṭhānabādhyatvaṃ mithyātvaṃ*)

More precisely (Advaitasiddhi, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī): mithyā is that which can be sublated while its substratum continues to exist. The snake is sublated; the rope remains. The world is sublated; Brahman remains. This is the structural definition: mithyā-ness is not about how something seems but about its relationship to what underlies it.

This definition explicitly excludes *asat*: the non-existent cannot be sublated because it cannot first appear. Sublation (*bādha*) requires a prior cognition — you must first cognize the snake before the corrective rope-cognition can sublate it. The sky-lotus never appears, so it cannot be sublated. Mithyā is precisely that which does appear and can then be sublated.

## The Snake-Rope Example — Parsed Through Ontological Levels

The rope-snake illustration is the canonical example of adhyāsa (superimposition — see adhyasa.md) and the most instructive lens for understanding mithyā:

| Stage | Ontological Level | Status |
|-------|------------------|--------|
| The rope | Pāramārthika (in the metaphor) | Real; the adhiṣṭhāna |
| The snake (as cognized in the dark) | Prātibhāsika | Mithyā; real from the deluded standpoint; sublated by the rope-cognition |
| The snake (after sublation) | Asat-like (no longer any cognition) | The snake "was never there" — but it was experienced, so it is not purely asat |

Mapping to the cosmological case:
- Brahman = the rope (the substratum)
- The world = the snake (dependently real, superimposed)
- Brahma-jñāna = the corrective light-cognition that reveals the rope where the snake appeared to be

The world is not nothing. It is genuinely experienced. But its experience-status is mithyā — dependent on Brahman, sublatable by brahma-jñāna, not self-subsistent.

## Mithyā ≠ Māyā

This distinction is the single most common AI conflation involving mithyā. They are related but distinct:

| Term | Category | What it Names |
|------|----------|---------------|
| **Māyā** | Power / Causal | The *śakti* (power) of Brahman by which the world-appearance is produced; the mechanism of appearance; Brahman's inscrutable creative power |
| **Mithyā** | Ontological Status | The *status* of what māyā produces; the world's dependent-real character; not the power that causes it but the result's standing |

Māyā explains *how* the world appears. Mithyā names *what kind of reality* the appearance has. A stage magician can explain *how* a trick is done (māyā-level explanation) without changing *what the trick is* — an appearance without ultimate substance (mithyā-level standing). Both are needed; they are not interchangeable.

The further distinction: *māyā* is sometimes used in colloquial and poetic contexts to mean "illusion" or "unreality" (especially in Purāṇic literature). Advaita epistemology does not support this usage — māyā as a technical term in Śaṅkara is the inscrutable power (*anirvacanīya śakti*) of Brahman, not a synonym for "unreal."

## Mithyā ≠ Buddhist Śūnyatā

Advaita explicitly differentiates itself from Buddhist śūnyavāda (the Mādhyamaka position that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence, *svabhāvaśūnya*):

**Buddhist śūnya:** phenomena are dependently originated (*pratītyasamutpanna*) — no phenomenon has inherent existence (*svabhāva*); all are relational and empty of self-nature. The "emptiness" is absolute — there is no non-empty foundation; even śūnyatā itself is śūnya.

**Advaita mithyā:** the world is dependently real — but it depends on Brahman, a positive, self-subsistent conscious ground. The world's mithyātva is not emptiness; it is contingency on a real basis. Brahman is not mithyā; Brahman is the *adhiṣṭhāna* (substratum) on which mithyā rests. Remove the adhiṣṭhāna and the mithyā collapses — which is why the Advaita critique of Buddhist śūnyavāda is that it "leaves no positive remainder" (niḥśeṣaśūnyavāda).

Śaṅkara is explicitly hostile to Buddhist śūnyavāda on exactly this ground (Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya 2.2.28–32): if everything were śūnya (empty/non-existent), even the cognition of śūnyatā would be non-existent, and the Mādhyamika teaching itself would have no status. Mithyā is not śūnya — it is *anirvacanīya* (indescribable as real or unreal) resting on a *vacanīya* ground (Brahman, fully describable as *sat-cit-ānanda*).

## Mithyā and the Pramāṇas

Mithyā-status does not undermine the validity of empirical pramāṇas. This is a frequent misconception — if the world is mithyā, how can any perception or inference about it be valid?

Advaita's answer (Vedāntaparibhāṣā): the pramāṇas produce *abādhita jñāna* (uncontradicted knowledge) within the vyāvahārika frame. Pratyakṣa of a pot correctly establishes the pot's presence at the empirical level. The pot's mithyā-status (dependency on Brahman, sublatable by brahma-jñāna) is a pāramārthika-level claim, not a challenge to the pot's empirical-level cognizability. The two levels do not interfere: the mithyātva of the pot is irrelevant to the question "is there a pot on the table?" The answer to that question is: yes, and pratyakṣa is the correct pramāṇa to establish it.

This is why Advaita is not phenomenal skepticism: ordinary empirical knowledge is fully valid at the empirical level. The philosophical claim is about ultimate ontological status, not about whether empirical knowledge works.

## The Philosophical Work Mithyā Does

The concept accomplishes four philosophical functions in Advaita:

1. **Avoids annihilationism (asat-vāda):** The world is not nothing; experience is real; empirical knowledge is valid. Advaita is not nihilism.

2. **Avoids independent realism:** The world is not independently real (*sat*); it cannot exist apart from Brahman; there is no material reality coequal with Brahman. Advaita is not dualism.

3. **Explains adhyāsa:** The world's mithyā-status is why adhyāsa is structurally possible — the superimposed (snake) must be mithyā (not asat, not sat) for the structure of superimposition to work. A pure non-entity cannot be superimposed; an absolutely real entity cannot be sublated.

4. **Opens the liberation path:** Because the world is mithyā (sublatable), liberating knowledge that removes adhyāsa also removes the world's apparent independent standing. Liberation is not the destruction of the world (it is still experienced by the jīvanmukta) but the dissolution of the ignorance by which it was taken as independently real.

## Cross-References
- [Adhyāsa](adhyasa.md) — superimposition; the mechanism that produces the appearance of mithyā entities as independently real; mithyā is the status of what adhyāsa presents; build with this file (CRITICAL_pairs)
- [Vyāvahārika](vyavaharika.md) — the empirical level of reality; the primary sub-level of mithyā applicable to the world of ordinary experience
- [Pāramārthika](paramarthika.md) — the absolute level; Brahman; what is not mithyā; the adhiṣṭhāna on which mithyā depends
- [Prātibhāsika](pratibhasika.md) — the apparent level; the lower sub-level of mithyā, applicable to illusions, dreams, and error-objects
- [Vivartavāda](vivartavada.md) — Advaita's causal theory; the world is a vivarta (apparent transformation) of Brahman, not a real transformation; vivartavāda is the causal-theory correlate of mithyātva
- [Bādha / Bādhita](badha-badhita.md) — sublation; the defining criterion for mithyā is bādhyatva — susceptibility to sublation; bādha is how mithyā entities are cognized as mithyā after liberating knowledge
- [Pramāṇa](pramana.md) — mithyā-status does not undermine empirical pramāṇas; valid cognition within the vyāvahārika frame; the relationship between empirical epistemology and mithyā ontology

## Audience Metaphor

Like a dream that, while you are in it, is completely real — you feel fear, joy, pain, connection; the people you meet have weight and history; the landscape obeys consistent rules. It is not 'false' while you are dreaming. But when you wake up, it is clear it was dependent on the sleeping consciousness — it had no existence apart from that ground. The dream-world is not nothing (it was thoroughly experienced) and it is not ultimately real (it was sublated by waking). Mithyā is the ontological name for that status: dependently real, subject to sublation, not ultimately self-subsistent. The Advaita claim is not that the world feels like a dream — it doesn't. The claim is that the world has the same ontological structure as a dream with respect to its ground (Brahman).

## Citations

1. [Vivekacūḍāmaṇi](/references/vivekachudamani.md) vv.20–21 — Śaṅkara's condensed formula: *brahma satyaṃ jagat mithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ*; Brahman is real (sat), the world is mithyā, the jīva is Brahman and nothing else
2. [Pañcadaśī](/references/panchadashi.md) 1.7 — Vidyāraṇya on the three-valued ontology; anirvacanīya as the precise category for mithyā; the rope-snake example parsed through ontological levels
3. [Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya](/references/brahmasutra-bhasya.md) 2.1.14 — Śaṅkara's argument that the world is anirvacanīya — not describable as purely existent (sat) or purely non-existent (asat) — answering the Sāṃkhya charge that Advaita must posit pure non-existence
4. [Advaitasiddhi](/references/advaitasiddhi.md) (Madhusūdana Sarasvatī) — technical analysis of mithyātva; the bādhyatva (sublatable) criterion; mithyā distinguished from asat by bādhyatva vs. asamāna-adhikaraṇa-pratiyogitva

## Error Genealogy

This term is a secondary node in a documented mistranslation chain (a partial genealogy):

- Māyā-as-"illusion" (the world does not exist) was broadcast into Western philosophy by Schopenhauer's "veil of Maya" (*The World as Will and Representation*, 1818/1844) and completed by popular culture; the flattening erases the corpus's four distinct māyā-level treatments at once. See [G8 — Māyā = illusion](../../../GENEALOGIES.md) in the repository root for the full chain and sources.
