---
type: Concept
bundle: nyaya-vaisheshika
bundle_version: 0.9.0
id: pramana
title: Pramāṇa
iast: Pramāṇa
devanagari: प्रमाण
description: A means or instrument of valid knowing (pramā); Nyāya admits four (perception, inference, comparison, testimony) as realist instruments that reveal a mind-independent object; NOT 'proof' in the logician's sense, NOT subjective justification, NOT the Advaita treatment where the pramāṇas are finally sublated in non-dual knowing.
darshana:
- Nyāya
- Vaiśeṣika
school_scope: 'Nyāya is the source school of pramāṇa theory and holds a robust realism: a pramāṇa is an instrument that makes a real, independent object known. vedanta-epistemology v0.3 treats the same term within Advaita, where the pramāṇas are provisionally valid (vyāvahārika) and finally transcended. Cross-linked, school-scoped; not a duplicate.'
text_source: Nyāya Sūtra 1.1.3
tags:
- pramana
- epistemology
- nyaya
- realism
- knowledge
not:
- term: proof (a logical demonstration)
  why: A pramāṇa is not an argument that establishes a conclusion; it is a knowledge-producing instrument, a source. Perception is a pramāṇa yet proves nothing in the logical sense. Rendering pramāṇa as 'proof' collapses a theory of knowledge-sources into a theory of arguments.
  instead: Define pramāṇa as an instrument of valid cognition, a source through which a knower (pramātṛ) comes to know a real object (prameya); Nyāya's four are perception, inference, comparison, and testimony.
- term: subjective justification (a believer's warrant)
  why: 'Nyāya pramāṇa is object-directed and realist: it is the instrument by which an independent fact becomes known, assessed by whether it delivers a true cognition of that fact, not by the internal justification a believer can produce. The account is closer to reliabilism than to internalist justification.'
- term: the Advaita pramāṇas that are ultimately sublated
  why: In Advaita the pramāṇas are valid only at the empirical level and are finally set aside in liberating knowledge. In Nyāya they are simply the standing sources of truth about a real, plural world; there is no higher standpoint that cancels them.
related:
- /concepts/pratyaksha.md
- /concepts/anumana.md
- /concepts/upamana.md
- /concepts/shabda.md
- /concepts/pramanya.md
timestamp: '2026-07-02'
okf_version: '0.2'
license: CC BY-SA 4.0
---

# Pramāṇa -- प्रमाण

**Not:** proof, subjective justification, sublated pramanas

## What It Actually Means

Pramāṇa is the master concept of Nyāya epistemology: an instrument of valid knowing. Knowledge is analysed as a fourfold structure, the knower (pramātṛ), the object (prameya), the instrument (pramāṇa), and the resulting valid cognition (pramā or pramiti). Nyāya recognises exactly four pramāṇas: pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), upamāna (comparison), and śabda (testimony); it argues against both the Cārvāka reduction to perception alone and the Mīmāṃsā expansion to six. The framework is unashamedly realist: a pramāṇa succeeds when it makes known an object that exists independently of the knowing. This is the deepest contrast with the Vedāntic use of the same word, where the pramāṇas ultimately give way; for Nyāya they are the permanent architecture of a world that is simply, durably real.

## Audience Metaphor

Think of four different instruments in a lab: a microscope, a logic engine, a matching guide, and a trusted colleague's report. Each is a distinct way the world gets into your knowledge; none is a 'proof' and none is just your say-so. Pramāṇa names the instrument-slot itself. Nyāya insists there are exactly four such instruments, and that what they show you is really out there.

## Citations

1. Nyāya Sūtra 1.1.3 (enumeration of the four pramāṇas) -- see [references/nyaya-sutra.md](../references/nyaya-sutra.md)
2. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Nyāyamañjarī, defending the fourfold list -- see [references/nyayamanjari.md](../references/nyayamanjari.md)
3. Cross-bundle: pramāṇa in vedanta-epistemology v0.3 -- the Advaita, ultimately-sublated treatment; school-scoped and reciprocally linked
