---
type: Concept
bundle: vedanta-epistemology
bundle_version: "0.3.0"
id: prameya
title: "Prameya — The Known Object (Cognitive Object in the Pramāṇa-Triad)"
iast: "prameya"
devanagari: "प्रमेय"
description: "The Known Object (Cognitive Object in the Pramāṇa-Triad). Not thing (generic), not fact or proposition."
darshana:
  - Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika
  - Advaita Vedānta
school_scope: "Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta primarily (prameya as the object-domain of valid cognition in the pramāṇa-triad; Nyāya is especially systematic about prameya: Nyāyasūtra 1.1.9 lists twelve padārthas [categories] as prameyas — the objects whose correct knowledge, along with correct knowledge of the pramāṇas and the purpose of inquiry, leads to mokṣa in the Nyāya system; the twelve include ātman, body, senses, sense-objects, cognition, manas, activity, faults, rebirth, results, suffering, and liberation; Advaita inherits the prameya framework at the vyāvahārika level but adds a critical pāramārthika dimension that complicates the concept: Brahman, the ultimate object of Vedāntic inquiry, cannot be a prameya in the ordinary sense — Brahman is not an object facing a subject, because Brahman is the ātman, the very subject of all cognition; this non-standard object-status of Brahman requires a special epistemological account — which Advaita provides through the theory of Mahāvākya-lakṣaṇā and the dissolution of the pramātṛ-prameya duality)"
text_source: "Nyāyasūtra 1.1.9 (Gautama — the enumeration of twelve prameyas as the objects whose right understanding leads to liberation; prameya is defined here as 'that which is to be known correctly via pramāṇa'); Tattvabodha (attributed to Śaṅkara — the pramāṇa-triad: pramātā, pramāṇa, prameya, pramā; pedagogical introduction); Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya 1.1.1 (Śaṅkara — 'athāto brahma-jijñāsā': the inquiry into Brahman is introduced, raising the Advaita question of whether Brahman can be a prameya at all; Śaṅkara's commentary establishes Brahman as the 'subject' of Vedānta-inquiry while clarifying that Brahman-knowledge is not like the knowledge of an external object); Vedāntaparibhāṣā Ch.1 (Dharmarājādhvarīndra — systematic account of the prameya-domain for each pramāṇa in the Advaita framework)"
tags:
  - advaita-vedanta
  - nyaya
  - epistemology
  - pramana
  - object-of-cognition
  - tier-3
not:
  - term: "thing (generic)"
    why: "prameya is specifically the object within a pramāṇa-framework: the domain that a particular pramāṇa is competent to cognize; every prameya is a thing but not every thing is, at a given moment, a prameya; a premeya is a thing insofar as it is available to a competent pramāṇa; this technical qualification distinguishes prameya from a generic ontological category"
    instead: "Keep The Known Object untranslated; do not substitute the English term."
  - term: "fact or proposition"
    why: "a fact is what is stated by a proposition; a prameya is the object that the proposition is about; when anumāna (inference) produces the cognition \"there is fire on the hill,\" the prameya is the hill-fire (the object-domain of the inference); the pramā (valid cognition) is the cognition corresponding to that object; the proposition \"fire is on the hill\" is neither the prameya nor the pramā but a linguistic articulation of the cognitive result"
  - term: "physical object only"
    why: "the prameya-domain extends beyond physical objects; for anupalabdhi (non-apprehension), the prameya is an absence (abhāva) — not a physical thing but the non-presence of something; for anumāna, the prameya is the inferred entity (fire, available via its mark); for śabda (verbal testimony), the prameya is the referent of the words; for arthāpatti (postulation), the premeya is the unobserved fact postulated to explain an incongruity; confining prameya to physical objects misses the full range"
  - term: "phenomenon (Kantian)"
    why: "Kant's phenomenon is the object as constituted by the forms of intuition (space, time) and categories of understanding; the prameya is not defined by constitutive contribution from the subject's cognitive forms but by its availability to a valid pramāṇa; Indian epistemology does not have a Kantian distinction between phenomena (objects as they appear to subjects) and noumena (objects as they are in themselves) — the prameya is simply the object as the pramāṇa can validly cognize it"
  - term: "Brahman (as prameya"
    why: "the most important NOT) — Brahman is not a prameya in the ordinary sense; ordinary prameyas are objects that face a cognizing subject; Brahman is the ātman — the very subject — and cannot stand over against a subject as an object to be cognized from outside; saying \"Brahman is the prameya of Vedānta inquiry\" requires immediate qualification: the Mahāvākya does not deliver a cognition of Brahman-as-external-object but redirects the jīva's consciousness toward recognizing its own nature as Brahman; the Vedāntaparibhāṣā account: śabda-pramāṇa (Mahāvākya-śabda) produces the pramā \"aham brahmāsmi\" — but this is a unique pramā where the prameya (Brahman) is identical with the pramātṛ (the jīva-as-ātman); no other pramāṇa-event has this structure"
related:
  - /concepts/pramana.md
  - /concepts/prama.md
  - /concepts/pramata.md
  - /concepts/pratyaksha.md
  - /concepts/anumana.md
  - /concepts/shabda-pramana.md
  - /concepts/adhyasa.md
  - /concepts/mithya.md
timestamp: "2026-06-20"
okf_version: "0.2"
license: "CC BY-SA 4.0"
---

# Prameya — प्रमेय

**Not:** thing (generic), fact or proposition, physical object only, phenomenon (Kantian), Brahman (as prameya

**Prameya** is the known object — the third structural element of the pramāṇa-triad in Indian epistemology. The triad: pramātṛ (knowing subject) + pramāṇa (instrument of valid cognition) + prameya (object to be known) → pramā (valid cognition). The prameya is the domain toward which a pramāṇa is directed; its correct cognition produces pramā.

Each pramāṇa has its own prameya-domain: pratyakṣa (perception) cognizes present sensory objects; anumāna (inference) cognizes entities accessible via their marks (liṅgas); śabda (verbal testimony) cognizes the referents of valid speakers' words; upamāna (comparison) cognizes similarity-relations; arthāpatti (postulation) cognizes unexpressed facts required to explain apparent incongruities; anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) cognizes absences (abhāva). The premeya-domain of each pramāṇa defines what it is and is not competent to establish.

## Etymology

From Sanskrit *pra + mā* (to cognize validly) + *-eya* (gerundive suffix: that which ought to be, that which is to be done or known). Literally: *prameya* = "that which is to be known validly," or "that which is the proper object of valid cognition." The gerundive form places prameya in relation to the epistemic act: it is defined by being available to a pramāṇa.

## The Prameya-Domain of Each Pramāṇa (Advaita Six-Pramāṇa Framework)

| Pramāṇa | Premeya-domain | Example |
|---------|---------------|---------|
| **Pratyakṣa** (perception) | Present sensory objects: color, form, sound, taste, smell, touch; mental states directly apprehended | The redness of fire; the heat of the stove |
| **Anumāna** (inference) | Entities accessible via a liṅga (mark): fire via smoke, the self via memory, future events via signs | Fire on the hill, inferred from smoke |
| **Śabda / Āgama** (testimony) | What valid speakers report; Vedic Mahāvākyas' referents | "Devadatta is in his house"; "Ātman is Brahman" |
| **Upamāna** (comparison) | Similarity-relations; the referent of comparative descriptions | The gavaya (wild ox) resembles a domestic cow |
| **Arthāpatti** (postulation) | The unexpressed fact required to explain an otherwise incongruent observation | Devadatta's nocturnal eating (postulated to explain his obesity despite daytime fasting) |
| **Anupalabdhi** (non-apprehension) | Absences (abhāva): the non-presence of an expected entity | The absence of a pot on the table |

The scope-matching of pramāṇa and prameya is the foundation of the Advaita position that different means of valid cognition cannot be extended beyond their proper domains: pratyakṣa cannot establish Brahman (which is not a sensory object), nor can anumāna (which requires a universally-known vyāpti relation that cannot include Brahman as a term), nor can upamāna. Only śabda — specifically the apauruṣeya Vedic Mahāvākyas — has the premeya-domain that reaches the ātman-Brahman relationship.

## The Nyāya Twelve Premeyas

Nyāyasūtra 1.1.9 enumerates twelve premeyas as the objects whose correct knowledge leads to liberation (in the Nyāya system):

1. Ātman (self)
2. Śarīra (body)
3. Indriya (sense organs)
4. Artha (sense objects)
5. Buddhi (intellect/cognition)
6. Manas (mind)
7. Pravṛtti (activity)
8. Doṣa (faults: rāga, dveṣa, moha)
9. Pretyabhāva (rebirth)
10. Phala (results/fruits of karma)
11. Duḥkha (suffering)
12. Apavarga (liberation)

This list reveals the Nyāya soteriology: liberation comes from correct knowledge (pramā) about the nature of these twelve entities — particularly understanding that suffering arises from doṣa, which arises from mistaken cognitions about self and objects. The Nyāya project is to provide correct pramās about these premeyas as the path to liberation.

Advaita does not reject this framework but places it within the vyāvahārika domain: the twelve premeyas are valid objects of vyāvahārika inquiry. The Advaita correction: the jīva who correctly knows all twelve premeyas still operates within the framework of adhyāsa — the apparently separate self knowing apparently separate objects. Brahma-jñāna dissolves the frame, not just the particular mistaken cognitions within it.

## The Problem of Brahman as Premeya

The central epistemological puzzle for Advaita is: **Can Brahman be a premeya?**

If Brahman could be a premeya in the ordinary sense, it would be an object facing a subject (the jīva as pramātṛ). But:

1. **Brahman is the ātman** — the very subject. A subject cannot face itself as an external object without already presupposing the subject-object duality that brahma-jñāna dissolves.

2. **Brahman has no distinguishing mark (liṅga)** — anumāna requires a vyāpti (pervasion relation) between a liṅga and what is inferred. Brahman, as all-pervasive (vibhu) and without qualities distinguishing it from what it permeates, cannot serve as the target of inferential cognition.

3. **Brahman is not a sensory object** — pratyakṣa is limited to what the sense organs, operating via the antaḥkaraṇa, can contact. Brahman is not an object in the sensory field.

**The Advaita solution:** Brahman is not a premeya in the ordinary sense but the *viṣaya* (subject-matter) of a special śabda-pramāṇa (Mahāvākya-śabda). The Mahāvākya does not operate by delivering a cognition of Brahman-as-external-object; instead, it uses lakṣaṇā (the secondary/implied sense) to point the jīva's consciousness toward its own nature. The primary (vācya) meaning of "tat tvam asi" would yield two different entities — Brahman and jīva — which is not the intended meaning; lakṣaṇā reveals the implied meaning: the identity of the witness-consciousness in the jīva with Brahman.

The result: the Mahāvākya's "premeya" is the jīva's own ātman — the pramātṛ itself. This is why BSBh 1.1.1 says Brahman is "already known as the self" (*ātmeti tu prasiddhaḥ*) — the inquiry is not into an unknown object but into the nature of the very subject conducting the inquiry.

## Premeya and Mithyā

At the pāramārthika level, all vyāvahārika premeyas are mithyā — they have dependent reality (they appear and function within the conventional frame) but no independent existence (they have no reality apart from Brahman in which they appear). The world of objects (sarva prameyas) is jagat mithyā — the second line of the Advaita mahāvākya-summary: *brahma satyam, jagan mithyā, jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ*.

This does not mean vyāvahārika premeyas are unreal in the sense of non-appearing or causally non-efficacious: fire burns, water quenches thirst, pot holds grain. But their apparent independent reality — their seeming to exist as standalone entities apart from the awareness that cognizes them — is the superimposition that adhyāsa maintains and brahma-jñāna removes.

After brahma-jñāna: the jīvanmukta continues to cognize premeyas at the vyāvahārika level (fire still burns). The premeyas continue to appear. But they appear within the recognition that their appearance is in Brahman — they are Brahman-appearing-as-apparent-multiplicity. Their mithyā status is known but does not prevent their vyāvahārika function.

## Cross-References
- [Pramāṇa](pramana.md) — the instrument that delivers valid cognition of the premeya; each pramāṇa has its own competent premeya-domain; the scope-matching of pramāṇa and premeya defines the boundaries of each instrument
- [Pramā](prama.md) — the valid cognition of the premeya; the result of the pramāṇa-triad operating correctly; pramā corresponds to its premeya as it actually is
- [Pramātṛ](pramata.md) — the knowing subject who employs the pramāṇa to cognize the premeya; in brahma-jñāna, the pramātṛ and the "premeya" are the same entity — the jīva recognizes its own nature as Brahman
- [Adhyāsa](adhyasa.md) — the mechanism that generates the apparent premeya-multiplicity; adhyāsa superimposes the appearance of an independently-real object-world on what is Brahman; the premeyas of vyāvahārika cognition are constituted by this superimposition
- [Mithyā](mithya.md) — the ontological status of vyāvahārika premeyas; they are mithyā — not utterly non-existent (asat) but not ultimately real (sat) — they have dependent being in Brahman
- [Śabda / Āgama (pramāṇa)](shabda-pramana.md) — the pramāṇa whose premeya is Brahman-the-ātman; the Mahāvākya-śabda operates via lakṣaṇā to reveal the ātman's nature, producing the unique "premeya-cognition" where object and subject are non-two
- [Pratyakṣa](pratyaksha.md) — the pramāṇa with the most restricted premeya-domain (present sensory objects); its domain's restriction is the reason brahma-jñāna cannot be pratyakṣa-based
- [Anumāna](anumana.md) — the pramāṇa whose premeya includes inferred entities accessible via marks (liṅgas); its premeya-domain cannot reach Brahman because Brahman has no liṅga separable from what it pervades

## Audience Metaphor

Imagine the instruments in an orchestra: each plays within its own register — the violin cannot play a tuba's lowest notes, the tuba cannot produce the violin's upper harmonics. Each instrument has its own prameya (the tonal range it can validly sound). Now imagine that the conductor's baton — which coordinates all the instruments — is itself not in anyone's range; it doesn't produce a note; it enables all the notes. Brahman is like the conductor's baton: not an instrument-domain (premeya), but the enabling presence that makes all instrument-domains possible. The Mahāvākya-śabda, rather than producing another 'note,' points the music toward the silence out of which all notes arise. This is why the Mahāvākya's 'premeya' is the pramātṛ's own nature — the pointing turns inward.

## Citations

1. [Nyāyasūtra](/references/nyaya-sutra.md) 1.1.9 (Gautama) — the central Nyāya text on prameya: lists the twelve padārthas as prameyas; establishes that the correct understanding of premeya (in combination with correct understanding of pramāṇa and the fruit of inquiry) is a means to liberation in the Nyāya system; Nyāya's approach: liberation comes from correct knowledge of what actually exists, which requires knowing the correct premeyas
2. [Tattvabodha](/references/tattvabodha.md) (attributed to Śaṅkara) — the pedagogical pramāṇa-triad introduction: pramātā (knower), pramāṇa (instrument), prameya (object), pramā (valid cognition); the Advaita student must first learn the general framework before understanding how Brahman-inquiry modifies it
3. [Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya](/references/brahmasutra-bhasya.md) 1.1.1 (Śaṅkara) — 'athāto brahma-jijñāsā' (now therefore the inquiry into Brahman): Śaṅkara's commentary establishes that Brahman is both the subject-matter (viṣaya) of Vedānta-inquiry and — crucially — that this inquiry cannot be conducted as a standard pramāṇa-event seeking an external prameya; Brahman, as the ātman, is already known (self-evident); the inquiry aims at removing avidyā, not at first-time discovery of an unknown object
4. [Vedāntaparibhāṣā](/references/vedantaparibhasha.md) Ch.1 (Dharmarājādhvarīndra) — systematic Advaita account of prameya-domains for each pramāṇa; each pramāṇa cognizes its own premeya — pratyakṣa cognizes present sensory objects, anumāna inferred facts, śabda the referents of words, etc.; the account that most precisely captures how the śabda-pramāṇa (Mahāvākya) has Brahman as its prameya while acknowledging the non-standard character of this object-relation
