---
type: Concept
bundle: nyaya-vaisheshika
bundle_version: 0.9.0
id: upamana
title: Upamāna
iast: Upamāna
devanagari: उपमान
description: Comparison, the pramāṇa by which the tie between a name and an unfamiliar thing is known through told similarity (the classic gavaya case); an independent source of knowing, not reducible to inference or testimony; NOT analogy as a rhetorical device, NOT metaphor, NOT mere resemblance-noticing.
darshana:
- Nyāya
school_scope: Nyāya defends upamāna as a distinct fourth pramāṇa; Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist logicians fold it into inference or testimony. vedanta-epistemology v0.3 treats upamāna within the Advaita/Mīmāṃsā-influenced list; school-scoped, cross-linked.
text_source: Nyāya Sūtra 1.1.6
tags:
- upamana
- comparison
- analogy
- nyaya
- pramana
not:
- term: analogy as a persuasive or illustrative device
  why: 'Rhetorical analogy argues that because two things are alike in some respects they are alike in another. Upamāna does something narrower and more exact: it fixes the reference of a word by matching a told similarity to an observed object, so that one learns which animal ''gavaya'' names. It produces a specific piece of knowledge, the name-object tie, not a persuasive comparison.'
  instead: 'Define upamāna as reference-fixing by similarity: told ''a gavaya is like a cow'', one later meets the animal, recognises the likeness, and thereby knows that this is what ''gavaya'' denotes.'
- term: metaphor or figurative comparison
  why: Metaphor transfers meaning for expressive effect and asserts no literal identity. Upamāna is a literal cognitive achievement, learning the correct application of a term through a real resemblance, and belongs to epistemology, not poetics.
- term: inference in disguise
  why: 'Rival schools reduce upamāna to anumāna or śabda. Nyāya resists: the knowledge that this animal is what the word denotes is got neither by a pervasion (inference) nor merely by the informant''s words (testimony) but by the perceived similarity linking the two, which is why it earns a separate slot.'
related:
- /concepts/pramana.md
- /concepts/shabda.md
- /concepts/anumana.md
- /concepts/pratyaksha.md
timestamp: '2026-07-02'
okf_version: '0.2'
license: CC BY-SA 4.0
---

# Upamāna -- उपमान

**Not:** rhetorical analogy, metaphor, disguised inference

## What It Actually Means

Upamāna, comparison, is the pramāṇa Nyāya defends most against reduction. The stock case: a forest-dweller tells a townsman 'a gavaya (wild ox) is like a cow'; later, in the forest, the townsman sees an animal resembling a cow and knows 'this is what the word gavaya denotes'. The knowledge gained is precise, the tie between a name and the kind of thing it names, and Nyāya argues it is irreducible. It is not testimony, since the informant only supplied a simile, not the identifying encounter; and it is not inference, since no vyāpti carries the mind from mark to target. What does the work is the recognised similarity itself functioning as an instrument of knowing. That insistence on a distinct fourth source is characteristic of Nyāya's fine-grained, realist mapping of exactly how words and world get connected.

## Audience Metaphor

Someone tells you 'a mandolin sounds like a bright little guitar'. Months later you hear an unfamiliar instrument, catch the resemblance, and know: that is a mandolin. You were not told 'this is a mandolin' (testimony), and you ran no chain of reasoning (inference); the recognised likeness itself delivered the word-to-thing match. Upamāna is that specific click of matching a described likeness to a met object.

## Citations

1. Nyāya Sūtra 1.1.6 (definition of upamāna) -- see [references/nyaya-sutra.md](../references/nyaya-sutra.md)
2. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya Bhāṣya, the gavaya illustration -- see [references/nyaya-bhashya.md](../references/nyaya-bhashya.md)
3. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Nyāyamañjarī, against reducing upamāna to inference -- see [references/nyayamanjari.md](../references/nyayamanjari.md)
