---
type: Concept
bundle: vedanta-epistemology
bundle_version: "0.3.0"
id: aptavakya
title: "Āpta-vākya — Testimony of a Trustworthy Person (Verified Authoritative Testimony)"
iast: "āpta-vākya"
devanagari: "आप्तवाक्य"
description: "Testimony of a Trustworthy Person (Verified Authoritative Testimony). Not testimony (generic Western epistemology), not authority (social, institutional)."
darshana:
  - Nyāya
  - Mīmāṃsā
  - Advaita Vedānta
school_scope: "Nyāya primary — the formal epistemological account of āpta-vākya as the valid form of śabda-pramāṇa grounded in the direct knowledge and communicative intention of a trustworthy person (āpta); defined at Nyāyasūtra 1.1.7; Nyāya further subdivides āpta-vākya into testimony concerning seen (dṛṣṭa) empirical matters vs. unseen (adṛṣṭa) meta-empirical matters; Mīmāṃsā contrastive position — Mīmāṃsā (Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, Kumārila, Prabhākara) explicitly rejects āpta-vākya as the ground for Vedic authority; for Mīmāṃsā, Veda is apauruṣeya (not authored by any person, human or divine) and therefore its authority is not derivative from anyone's trustworthiness; āpta-vākya authority is pauruṣeya (person-dependent) and therefore fallible in principle, which is precisely what apauruṣeyatva avoids; Advaita application — Advaita follows Mīmāṃsā on Vedic apauruṣeyatva but develops a parallel āpta-vākya concept for the guru (teacher): the guru who has realized Brahman through aparokṣa-anubhūti is an āpta in the domain of brahma-jñāna; the student's śravaṇa (hearing of the Mahāvākya) depends on receiving it from such an āpta-guru; this pauruṣeya āpta-vākya is not the ground of Vedic authority but the transmission mechanism for Vedic teaching in the guru-śiṣya context; Nyāya theism (Udayana) — Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali proposes God (Īśvara) as the supreme āpta, grounding Vedic authority in divine omniscience; Śaṅkara explicitly rejects this on the grounds that it would reduce Vedic authority to dependence on a person's (even a divine person's) reliability"
text_source: "Nyāyasūtra 1.1.7 (āpta-vākya as the third pramāṇa in Nyāya — 'āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ' — 'verbal testimony is the instruction of an āpta'; Nyāyasūtra 1.1.8 — 'sa dvividho dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthatvāt' — āpta-vākya is twofold depending on whether the matter concerns seen/empirical or unseen/meta-empirical domains); Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāṣya on NS 1.1.7 (the āpta defined as one who directly knows the matter in question [sākṣātkṛtadharman], has the capacity to teach it, and is free from the defects that cause false speech [doṣas: rāga/passion, dveṣa/hatred, moha/confusion]); Nyāyakusumāñjali 4.1–4 (Udayana — the argument that God/Īśvara is the supreme āpta; omniscience, benevolence, and freedom from all doṣas make God the ideal āpta whose testimony [the Veda] has maximum authority); BSBh intro and 1.1.3 (Śaṅkara — Vedic authority rests on apauruṣeyatva; Veda is not the testimony of any person, divine or human; this is why Vedic śabda has unconditional svataḥprāmāṇya — it is not conditioned by anyone's reliability); Upadeśasāhasrī 1.1.1–1.1.5 (Śaṅkara — the guru-śiṣya relationship as the practical epistemic context for transmission of brahma-jñāna; the guru must be a śrotriya [one versed in scripture] and brahma-niṣṭha [established in Brahman] — this is the āpta-specification for the guru as transmitter of Mahāvākya)"
tags:
  - shabda-pramana
  - testimony
  - epistemology
  - nyaya
  - advaita-vedanta
  - guru
  - pramana-theory
  - tier-3
not:
  - term: "testimony (generic Western epistemology)"
    why: "Western analytic epistemology of testimony (Reid, Coady, Lackey) concerns the general question of when and why beliefs acquired from others count as knowledge; āpta-vākya is more specific: it concerns a particular sub-type of śabda-pramāṇa grounded in the testifier's own direct knowledge (aparokṣa-jñāna) of the matter; the Western tradition generally does not require that the testifier have direct non-inferential knowledge of the fact — a reliable reporter who learned from others counts; āpta-vākya specifically requires that the āpta have sākṣātkāra (direct realization) in the relevant domain"
    instead: "Keep Testimony of a Trustworthy Person untranslated; do not substitute the English term."
  - term: "authority (social, institutional)"
    why: "āpta-vākya authority rests strictly on the testifier's direct knowledge (sākṣātkāra) and freedom from cognitive defects (doṣas: rāga, dveṣa, moha); it is not grounded in social position, institutional role, degrees held, or reputation; a socially unknown person with direct knowledge is an āpta; a socially prominent person with only book-learning is not an āpta in the domain they have not directly realized"
  - term: "witness testimony (legal)"
    why: "legal witness testimony in the Western tradition concerns what a person observed and remembers, assessed by a court using cross-examination and rules of evidence; āpta-vākya is a philosophical category concerning the epistemic conditions under which a testifier's word constitutes a pramāṇa; these are related but distinct concepts; conflating them imports legal-evidentiary frameworks that distort the epistemological concept"
  - term: "scripture"
    why: "āpta-vākya is person-dependent testimony (pauruṣeya); Vedic scripture (śruti) in Mīmāṃsā-Advaita is specifically not āpta-vākya because it is apauruṣeya (without a personal author); the conflation of āpta-vākya with śruti is precisely the Nyāya theistic move (Udayana: God is the āpta of Veda) that Śaṅkara rejects; in Mīmāṃsā-Advaita, the authority of Veda and the authority of āpta-vākya have different epistemological grounds"
  - term: "hearsay"
    why: "hearsay (in legal usage) is testimony about what another person said, treated with epistemic suspicion because it inserts an unverifiable chain; āpta-vākya is the opposite: it is the gold standard of testimony precisely because the āpta has direct knowledge of the matter and is not reporting what they heard from others"
related:
  - /concepts/shabda-pramana.md
  - /concepts/pramana.md
  - /concepts/svatahpramanya.md
  - /concepts/aparoksha-anubhuti.md
  - /concepts/tarka.md
  - /concepts/anumana.md
timestamp: "2026-06-20"
okf_version: "0.2"
license: "CC BY-SA 4.0"
---

# Āpta-vākya — आप्तवाक्य

**Not:** testimony (generic Western epistemology), authority (social, institutional), witness testimony (legal), scripture, hearsay

**Āpta-vākya** (āpta = trustworthy/reliable; vākya = speech/statement) is the technical term in Nyāya epistemology for **testimony of a person qualified by direct knowledge** — the word of someone who has directly realized the matter they communicate, who intends to communicate it accurately, and who is free from the cognitive defects (*doṣas*) that cause false or distorted speech.

In Nyāya, āpta-vākya is the foundational form of *śabda* as a pramāṇa (Nyāyasūtra 1.1.7: *āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ* — "verbal testimony is the instruction of an āpta"). The pramāṇa-force of testimony — what makes someone's word a source of valid cognition rather than mere noise — is grounded in the *āpta-status* of the testifier.

## The Three Conditions of Āpta-Status

Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya* (on NS 1.1.7) specifies three conditions an āpta must satisfy:

| Condition | Term | Content |
|-----------|------|---------|
| Direct knowledge | *Sākṣātkṛtadharman* | The āpta has directly realized the matter in the relevant domain — not book-knowledge or inference from others, but immediate realization |
| Benevolent intention | *Śiṣya-hitāya icchā* | The āpta desires the student's/listener's benefit, not personal gain or social status |
| Accurate communication | *Yathādṛṣṭam ākhyāna* | The āpta communicates the matter exactly as realized, without distortion, omission, or exaggeration |

Failure of any condition removes āpta-status: one who has direct knowledge but communicates inaccurately (for whatever reason) is not an āpta for epistemic purposes; one who has benevolent intention but only indirect knowledge cannot yield pramā on matters beyond ordinary inference.

The cognitive defects (*doṣas*) that destroy āpta-status are:
- **Rāga** (passion/attachment) — the testifier may shade the truth in favor of what they desire
- **Dveṣa** (aversion/hatred) — they may shade it against what they dislike
- **Moha** (confusion/delusion) — their knowledge may itself be distorted at the source

## Dṛṣṭa and Adṛṣṭa Testimony (NS 1.1.8)

Nyāyasūtra 1.1.8 distinguishes two domains of āpta-vākya:

**Dṛṣṭa-artha** (seen/empirical matters): āpta testimony about facts accessible in principle to ordinary observation — the physician who testifies to disease causation, the geographer who testifies to distant terrain. The listener could in principle verify this through their own perception; the āpta's testimony shortcuts this process. Such testimony is assessed by checking against available observation and by the āpta's track record.

**Adṛṣṭa-artha** (unseen/meta-empirical matters): āpta testimony about matters not accessible to ordinary observation — dharma (what actions lead to good/bad outcomes in future lives), the nature of Brahman, the effects of ritual. Here the listener cannot independently verify; they depend entirely on the āpta's direct realization. This is the epistemologically more demanding and interesting category: how does one identify an āpta for *adṛṣṭa* matters?

For Nyāya, the solution involves examining:
- Whether the testifier's *dṛṣṭa* testimony is reliable (track record)
- Whether the testifier shows the behavioral markers consistent with claiming direct realization of the *adṛṣṭa*
- Whether the teaching is internally consistent and free from contradiction

## The Nyāya Theistic Account (Udayana)

Udayana's *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (4th century) builds the argument that **God (Īśvara) is the supreme āpta** and that Vedic authority is grounded in divine āptatva:

1. Veda pertains primarily to *adṛṣṭa* matters (dharma, the nature of the self, liberated states)
2. *Adṛṣṭa* matters require an āpta with direct realization of them
3. No finite human has such comprehensive direct realization
4. God is omniscient (sarvajña), benevolent (sarvabhūtahita), and free from all doṣas
5. Therefore God is the supreme āpta; Veda is God's testimony; Vedic authority rests on divine āptatva

This argument ties Vedic authority to theism — a move Mīmāṃsā and Advaita both resist.

## The Mīmāṃsā Rejection

Mīmāṃsā (Kumārila, Prabhākara) rejects the āpta-vākya account of Vedic authority entirely:

- **Apauruṣeyatva:** Veda has no author — human or divine. It is not the testimony of any person. Its authority (*prāmāṇya*) is therefore not derivative from any individual's reliability.
- **Why this matters:** If Veda were God's testimony, its authority would depend on God's reliability. But God's reliability must itself be established — by what? By testimony? By inference? This generates a regress or circularity. The Mīmāṃsā position cuts this knot: Veda's authority is intrinsic (*svataḥ*), not derived from a testifier.
- **Āpta-vākya is pauruṣeya:** All person-authored testimony is in principle fallible (even if a specific āpta is reliable). Vedic authority must be unconditional; therefore it cannot rest on āpta-status.

Mīmāṃsā does use āpta-vākya for non-Vedic testimony (medical texts, authoritative teachers in secular domains) — but not for the Veda itself.

## Advaita's Position: Apauruṣeyatva + Guru-Āpta

Advaita follows Mīmāṃsā on Vedic apauruṣeyatva (BSBh intro, BSBh 1.1.3): the Veda is not the testimony of God or any person; its authority is intrinsic and unconditional. Śaṅkara explicitly rejects Udayana's argument that God-as-āpta grounds Vedic authority.

**But Advaita develops a parallel āpta-vākya concept for the guru:** The *guru* (teacher) who has realized Brahman through *aparokṣa-anubhūti* is an āpta in the domain of brahma-jñāna. The student who approaches a qualified guru receives the Mahāvākya — the Vedic teaching of non-duality — through the guru's transmission. This transmission has the structure of āpta-vākya:

- The guru has direct realization (*brahma-niṣṭha*) — satisfying *sākṣātkṛtadharman*
- The guru desires the student's liberation (*śiṣya-hitāya icchā*)
- The guru communicates exactly what they have realized (*yathādṛṣṭam ākhyāna*)

Śaṅkara's *Upadeśasāhasrī* specifies the guru-qualification: "*śrotriya brahma-niṣṭha*" — versed in scripture (providing access to apauruṣeya Vedic knowledge) and established in Brahman (providing the āpta-qualification for conveying that knowledge effectively).

**The two-level structure in Advaita:**

| Level | Type of authority | Source | Epistemological ground |
|-------|------------------|--------|----------------------|
| Veda (Mahāvākya) | Apauruṣeya | No author | Intrinsic svataḥprāmāṇya |
| Guru's transmission | Pauruṣeya āpta-vākya | Guru with aparokṣa-anubhūti | Guru's sākṣātkāra + freedom from doṣas |

The student needs both: the apauruṣeya Veda is the ultimate source, but the āpta-guru is the transmission context that makes the Mahāvākya operative. A student who reads "tat tvam asi" in a book without a qualified teacher's guidance has access to the words but not to the effective śravaṇa that the guru's āpta-transmission enables.

## Āpta-vākya and Svataḥprāmāṇya

In the Mīmāṃsā-Advaita framework, the relationship between āpta-vākya and svataḥprāmāṇya is nuanced:

- For **non-Vedic āpta-vākya** (testimony of a human teacher about empirical or meta-empirical matters), *parataḥprāmāṇya* applies — the testimony's validity is established *from outside*, by verifying the āpta's qualifications and track record.
- For **Vedic śabda**, *svataḥprāmāṇya* applies — validity is intrinsic; it does not require external verification of an author's reliability (there is no author).
- For the **guru's transmission** of Vedic Mahāvākya, the āpta-qualification of the guru is assessed (parataḥ), but the Mahāvākya content itself carries intrinsic Vedic authority (svataḥ).

This layering — parataḥ qualification of the human transmitter, svataḥ authority of the Vedic content being transmitted — is characteristic of Advaita's sophisticated integration of the two frameworks.

## Cross-References
- [Śabda-pramāṇa](shabda-pramana.md) — verbal testimony as a pramāṇa; āpta-vākya is the Nyāya analysis of *why* verbal testimony can be a pramāṇa (because of the āpta-status of the testifier); śabda-pramāṇa is the broader category; āpta-vākya is the theoretical grounding for the pauruṣeya (person-authored) sub-type
- [Svataḥprāmāṇya](svatahpramanya.md) — the contrast between svataḥ (intrinsic) and parataḥ (externally established) validity is directly relevant to how āpta-vākya and apauruṣeya Vedic testimony differ in their epistemic grounding
- [Aparokṣa-anubhūti](aparoksha-anubhuti.md) — the direct realization that constitutes the guru's āpta-qualification in the domain of brahma-jñāna; the guru's āptatva for Brahman-knowledge requires aparokṣa-anubhūti (not mere parokṣa/conceptual knowledge)
- [Pramāṇa](pramana.md) — the general epistemological framework; āpta-vākya situates within the śabda sub-category of the pramāṇa framework
- [Tarka](tarka.md) — hypothetical reasoning that supports testimony; in Advaita's manana stage, tarka supports the āpta-guru's Mahāvākya transmission by removing doubts, just as it supports anumāna by securing vyāpti; the āpta's word and tarka work together, neither alone sufficient for aparokṣa-anubhūti

## Audience Metaphor

Imagine you need to know whether the mushroom you found in the woods is edible. You have three possible sources: (1) a general cookbook that lists edible mushrooms (book-knowledge, like Vedic testimony); (2) a mycologist who has directly examined thousands of mushrooms and can identify yours on sight (āpta); (3) someone who heard from someone else that it's probably fine (hearsay). Āpta-vākya says: the mycologist's testimony has the highest epistemic force — not because of their title, but because they have direct knowledge (sākṣātkāra) of the relevant domain and no incentive to mislead you. The cookbook has a different kind of authority (systematic, accumulated). Hearsay is the worst. Nyāya epistemology and Advaita's account of the guru both track the difference between these three: the guru is the mycologist of brahma-jñāna.

## Citations

1. [Nyāyasūtra](/references/nyaya-sutra.md) 1.1.7 — 'āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ' — verbal testimony (śabda) is the instruction/communication (upadeśa) of an āpta; this is the Nyāya definition of śabda as a pramāṇa; the pramāṇa-force of verbal testimony derives from the āpta-status of the testifier
2. [Nyāyasūtra](/references/nyaya-sutra.md) 1.1.8 — 'sa dvividho dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthatvāt' — āpta-vākya is twofold: concerning seen (dṛṣṭa) matters (empirical facts that the āpta directly observed, e.g., a physician's testimony about disease causation) and unseen (adṛṣṭa) matters (meta-empirical facts not accessible to ordinary observation, e.g., dharma, after-life, Brahman's nature)
3. Vātsyāyana, [Nyāyabhāṣya](/references/nyaya-bhasya.md) on NS 1.1.7 — the definition of āpta: 'sākṣātkṛtadharmā yaḥ śiṣyahitāya icchayā yathādṛṣṭam artham ācaṣṭe sa āptaḥ' — an āpta is one who has directly realized the matter (sākṣātkṛtadharman), desires the student's benefit, and communicates the matter exactly as realized; three conditions: direct knowledge + benevolent intention + accurate communication
4. [Nyāyakusumāñjali](/references/nyayakusumanjali.md) 4.1–4 (Udayana) — the argument for Īśvara as supreme āpta: (1) God has omniscience (sarvajñatva) — direct knowledge of all matters; (2) God has no doṣas (rāga, dveṣa, moha are absent in a perfect being); (3) God has benevolent intention for all beings; therefore God's testimony (the Veda) satisfies all āpta-conditions maximally; therefore Vedic authority is grounded in divine āptatva
5. BSBh intro (Śaṅkara) — Veda is not pauruṣeya (not composed by any person); its authority is apauruṣeya; this is why Vedic śabda is unconditionally authoritative in its domain; no person's reliability — even God's — is its epistemic ground; 'there is no possibility of the Vedas being the production of a person possessing defects' — but this is because they have *no* personal author, not because their author is *perfectly reliable*
6. [Upadeśasāhasrī](/references/upadeshasahasri.md) 1.1.1–5 (Śaṅkara) — the guru as the transmission medium for brahma-jñāna: 'the teacher must be one who knows Brahman (brahmavid) and has the specific quality of being brahma-niṣṭha (established in Brahman)'; this is not āpta-vākya for Veda but āpta-qualification for the teacher who communicates the Vedic Mahāvākya; the student needs both the Mahāvākya itself (apauruṣeya) and a qualified teacher who can convey it effectively (pauruṣeya āpta)
