---
type: Concept
bundle: vedanta-epistemology
bundle_version: "0.3.0"
id: upamana
title: "Upamāna — Cognition through Resemblance"
iast: "upamāna"
devanagari: "उपमान"
description: "Cognition through Resemblance. Not analogy, not metaphor."
darshana:
  - Mīmāṃsā
  - Nyāya
  - Advaita Vedānta
school_scope: "cross-darśana (Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Advaita each accept upamāna; different analyses of what it produces; Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Cārvāka reduce or reject)"
text_source: "Tarkasaṃgraha §§21–22 (Annambhaṭṭa); Vedāntaparibhāṣā Ch.4 (Dharmarāja Adhvarin)"
tags:
  - pramana-shastra
  - epistemology
  - advaita-vedanta
  - mimamsa
  - nyaya
  - comparison
  - cross-darshana
  - tier-1
not:
  - term: "analogy"
    why: "analogy in Western rhetoric and logic is the transfer of a structural pattern from one domain to another as an argument or illustration; upamāna produces a specific type of new knowledge (recognition of a name-object relation), not an analogical argument"
    instead: "Keep Cognition through Resemblance untranslated; do not substitute the English term."
  - term: "metaphor"
    why: "metaphor is a linguistic-creative operation that attributes a property across domains for expressive effect; upamāna is an epistemological instrument producing valid cognition, not a figure of speech"
  - term: "simile"
    why: "simile ('like' or 'as') is a grammatical comparison noting resemblance; upamāna is not a comparison you make, it is a cognition that arises from perceived resemblance combined with prior description"
  - term: "comparison as argument"
    why: "upamāna is not reasoning from one case to another by noting similarity; the knowledge upamāna produces is sui generis — a name-reference cognition — not an argumentative inference"
  - term: "inference from similarity"
    why: "this collapses upamāna into anumāna; the critical distinction is that anumāna operates via vyāpti (invariable concomitance), while upamāna involves a prior description and a current resemblance-perception without the vyāpti structure"
related:
  - /concepts/pramana.md
  - /concepts/pratyaksha.md
  - /concepts/anumana.md
  - /concepts/arthapatti.md
  - /concepts/shabda-pramana.md
timestamp: "2026-06-20"
okf_version: "0.2"
license: "CC BY-SA 4.0"
---

# Upamāna — उपमान

**Not:** analogy, metaphor, simile, comparison as argument, inference from similarity

Upamāna is valid cognition that arises from the combination of a prior description of resemblance and the current perception of that resemblance, producing a specific kind of new knowledge: the recognition of the name-referent relation. It is the fourth pramāṇa in the Nyāya and Advaita lists — accepted as genuine and irreducible to perception or inference.

The classic example: A person from a city is told by a forester, "A gavaya (wild cow/nilgai) looks like a domestic cow." Later, in the forest, the city-person encounters an animal and perceives its resemblance to a domestic cow. At that moment, the cognition arises: *"This is what is called a gavaya."* That cognition — the recognition of what the name 'gavaya' refers to — is upamāna.

## Etymology

From Sanskrit *upa* (near, secondary, resembling) + *māna* (knowing, measuring, from root *mā*). Literally: knowing that which is near-to or resembles; knowledge through proximity-resemblance. The *upa-* prefix appears in words like *upāya* (near-way, means), *upaniṣad* (sitting near), *upadeśa* (instruction given in proximity) — consistently marking closeness or secondary relation.

## What Upamāna Produces and Why It Is Not Inference

The upamāna cognition produces one specific type of knowledge: **saṃjñā-saṃjñi-sambandha-jñāna** — knowledge of the relation between a name (*saṃjñā*) and its referent (*saṃjñin*). In the gavaya example: the name 'gavaya' and the referent (this animal before me) are related. I now know what 'gavaya' names.

This is irreducible to:

**Inference (anumāna):** Anumāna requires vyāpti — invariable concomitance that has been independently established. In the gavaya case, there is no vyāpti of the form "wherever there is an animal resembling a cow, it is called a gavaya." The resemblance alone is not a vyāpti-establishing mark; there is no general rule that animals resembling cows are gavalyas. What drives the cognition is the specific prior description combined with the specific current observation.

**Perception (pratyakṣa):** Perception gives me the animal's form, colour, and features — including its resemblance to a cow. But pratyakṣa alone does not give me the knowledge "this is what 'gavaya' refers to." The name-referent knowledge requires the prior description as a necessary component.

**Verbal testimony (śabda):** The forester's description "a gavaya looks like a cow" provides the prior knowledge. But the upamāna cognition itself arises later, in the forest, when the resemblance is perceived — not at the moment of hearing the description. Śabda delivers the description; upamāna is the cognitive event of applying that description to a currently perceived resemblance.

The independence of upamāna is established precisely by this gap: something new arises when the description meets the perception. That new cognitive event — the name-referent recognition — is the specific product of upamāna.

## School Positions on Upamāna

Cross-darśana disagreement on upamāna is sharp:

**Nyāya:** Accepts upamāna as the fourth independent pramāṇa. The Nyāya analysis focuses on the gavaya-type example and grounds the pramāṇa in the prior testimony plus current resemblance-perception.

**Mīmāṃsā:** Accepts upamāna as independent. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (Ślokavarttika) defends it against reduction to inference. The Mīmāṃsā analysis is particularly concerned with establishing that upamāna is not a subspecies of anumāna.

**Advaita Vedānta:** Accepts upamāna, following the Mīmāṃsā position. Dharmarāja Adhvarin (Vedāntaparibhāṣā) treats it as a genuine sixth pramāṇa (in the Advaita six-pramāṇa list, upamāna is fourth). The Advaita interest in upamāna is partly textual: certain Upaniṣadic passages use resemblance-language (*iva*, 'as it were') to describe Brahman — this generates hermeneutic questions that upamāna-theory addresses.

**Sāṃkhya-Yoga:** Reduces upamāna to either inference or testimony; not accepted as independent in the Yoga Sūtras' three-pramāṇa schema.

**Cārvāka:** Rejects all pramāṇas except pratyakṣa; upamāna is rejected as inference-dependent.

**Advaita vs. Nyāya — Subtle Divergence:** Nyāya grounds upamāna in the forester's testimony as a necessary prior component. Advaita (following Mīmāṃsā) locates the upamāna moment more precisely in the recognition-event in the forest: the cognition "this resembles what was described" is the functional basis, and the resulting knowledge "this is called a gavaya" is genuinely new rather than merely recalled. The distinction affects how upamāna is bounded against śabda.

## Upamāna and Brahman-Knowledge

Upamāna is not a significant pramāṇa for Brahman-knowledge in Advaita. Brahman is beyond resemblance — there is no prior description of the form "Brahman resembles X" that could ground a resemblance-perception and produce name-referent knowledge. Upamāna operates in the domain of perceptible worldly objects and their naming.

Where upamāna enters Advaita hermeneutics: the Upaniṣads use *iva* ("as if," "like") constructions — "Brahman appears *iva* (as if) with qualities." These *iva* usages are not upamāna-as-pramāṇa; they are grammatical qualifications indicating appearance without asserting a genuine resemblance. The distinction between upamāna (a pramāṇa for knowledge) and *iva*-constructions (grammatical devices) is maintained carefully in Śaṅkara's commentaries.

## Cross-References
- [Pramāṇa](pramana.md) — upamāna is the fourth pramāṇa in the Advaita six-pramāṇa list
- [Pratyakṣa](pratyaksha.md) — the perceptual component of upamāna (the current resemblance-perception); necessary but not sufficient
- [Anumāna](anumana.md) — the pramāṇa most often confused with upamāna; distinguished by vyāpti-structure vs. description-plus-resemblance structure
- [Śabda / Āgama (pramāṇa)](shabda-pramana.md) — the prior description that is a necessary component of upamāna; but the upamāna cognition is distinct from the śabda cognition
- [Arthāpatti](arthapatti.md) — the fifth pramāṇa; postulation; also frequently confused with inference

## Audience Metaphor

Like being told 'the new visiting professor looks like her more famous sibling' — then walking into the seminar room and immediately recognizing her without anyone pointing her out. The moment of recognition ('this is who they meant') is a distinct cognitive event: neither a recollection of what you were told, nor a fresh perception without that preparation, nor an inference. The told-resemblance and the seen-resemblance together produce a new unit of knowledge: the name-reference.

## Citations

1. [Tarkasaṃgraha](/references/tarkasangraha.md) §§21–22 — Annambhaṭṭa's concise analysis of upamāna and its classic example (gavaya recognition)
2. [Vedāntaparibhāṣā](/references/vedantaparibhasha.md) Ch.4 — Dharmarāja Adhvarin's treatment of upamāna as a genuine pramāṇa in Advaita
3. Nyāyadarśana 1.1.6 — Gautama's definition of upamāna as knowledge of a referent through resemblance to a known
4. [Ślokavarttika](/references/slokavarttika.md) — Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Mīmāṃsā analysis of upamāna and its difference from inference
