---
type: Concept
bundle: vedanta-epistemology
bundle_version: "0.3.0"
id: parinamavada
title: "Pariṇāmavāda — Real-Transformation Theory (Sāṃkhya / Viśiṣṭādvaita)"
iast: "pariṇāmavāda"
devanagari: "परिणामवाद"
description: "Real-Transformation Theory (Sāṃkhya / Viśiṣṭādvaita). Not evolution theory, not emergence."
darshana:
  - Sāṃkhya
  - Viśiṣṭādvaita
  - Advaita Vedānta
school_scope: "Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta accept pariṇāmavāda in different forms; Advaita Vedānta explicitly rejects pariṇāmavāda applied to the Brahman→world relation, replacing it with vivartavāda (appearance-causation); Dvaita Vedānta holds a form of dependent real transformation; build WITH vivartavada.md as rival_view_pair — pariṇāmavāda cannot be understood without its Advaita critique"
text_source: "Sāṃkhyakārikā 16 (Īśvarakṛṣṇa — the asatkāryavāda/satkāryavāda debate; Sāṃkhya's prakṛti-pariṇāma); Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya 2.1.26–27 (Śaṅkara's refutation of pariṇāmavāda applied to Brahman); Śrī Bhāṣya 2.1.26 (Rāmānuja's brahma-pariṇāmavāda — the Viśiṣṭādvaita defense)"
tags:
  - samkhya
  - visistadvaita
  - advaita-vedanta
  - ontology
  - causation
  - cosmology
  - prakrti
  - brahman
  - tier-2
  - critical
not:
  - term: "evolution theory"
    why: "'evolution' in the contemporary sense (Darwinian biological evolution) is a theory of population-level genetic change over time through selection; pariṇāmavāda is a metaphysical theory of causation — the relationship between a permanent cause and its real effects; there is a surface-word overlap (both involve 'transformation over time') but the mechanism, scale, domain, and philosophical stakes are entirely different; importing 'evolution' gives pariṇāmavāda unwarranted naturalistic associations"
    instead: "Keep Real-Transformation Theory untranslated; do not substitute the English term."
  - term: "emergence"
    why: "in philosophy of mind and complexity theory, 'emergence' describes the appearance of higher-level properties that are not predictable from or reducible to lower-level components (e.g., consciousness emerging from neural processes); pariṇāmavāda is not about emergence of higher-order properties from lower-order ones but about the real transformation of a single material cause into its effects; Sāṃkhya's prakṛti does not 'emerge' new properties — it modifies its actual constitution; emergence also tends toward irreducibility, while pariṇāma is precisely about a traced, real causal lineage from one substance to its modified forms"
  - term: "manifestation"
    why: "in New Age and perennialist contexts, 'manifestation' implies a spiritual or intentional process by which inner states become outer realities; pariṇāmavāda is about material (Sāṃkhya) or divine (Viśiṣṭādvaita) transformation, not intentional manifestation; importing 'manifestation' adds agency and teleology to what in Sāṃkhya is an automatic, triguṇa-driven modification of unconscious Prakṛti"
  - term: "emanation"
    why: "Plotinian emanation proceeds from the One through Nous to Soul to Matter in a hierarchy in which each level is a real product but the higher levels do not 'lose' themselves in producing the lower (the One remains the One even as it emanates); in Sāṃkhya pariṇāmavāda the cause (Prakṛti) genuinely transitions through states — the milk-state is actually gone when curd is produced; in brahma-pariṇāmavāda (Viśiṣṭādvaita) Brahman is genuinely the modified world-body; the causal mechanics are different"
  - term: "transformation theory (when used without qualification)"
    why: "while pariṇāmavāda IS a transformation theory, rendering it simply as 'transformation theory' loses the specific philosophical content: satkāryavāda (the effect pre-exists in the cause), the difference between nimitta-kāraṇa (efficient cause) and upādāna-kāraṇa (material cause), and the three-school divergence (Advaita's vivarta, Sāṃkhya's prakṛti-pariṇāma, Viśiṣṭādvaita's brahma-pariṇāma); the unqualified phrase 'transformation theory' will be confused with any number of Western transformation theories"
  - term: "pantheism"
    why: "when brahma-pariṇāmavāda (Viśiṣṭādvaita) is described, the temptation is to call it pantheism (God = the universe); Viśiṣṭādvaita's position is that the world is the body (śarīra) of Brahman (ātman), not that God and the universe are simply identical; Brahman remains the controlling ātman while the world is the dependent śarīra; this is panentheism (God includes but transcends the world) closer to the Śarīra-Ātman model, not pantheist identity"
related:
  - /concepts/vivartavada.md
  - /concepts/mithya.md
  - /concepts/paramarthika.md
  - /concepts/vyavaharika.md
  - /concepts/adhyasa.md
  - /concepts/badha-badhita.md
timestamp: "2026-06-20"
okf_version: "0.2"
license: "CC BY-SA 4.0"
---

# Pariṇāmavāda — परिणामवाद

**Not:** evolution theory, emergence, manifestation, emanation, transformation theory (when used without qualification), pantheism

Pariṇāmavāda is the philosophical position that effects are real transformations of their causes — the cause genuinely modifies itself into the effect. In Indian philosophy, this theory defines the Sāṃkhya cosmology (Prakṛti actually transforms into the twenty-four tattvas) and the Viśiṣṭādvaita cosmology (Brahman actually transforms, as body, into the world). Advaita Vedānta explicitly rejects pariṇāmavāda applied to the Brahman→world relation in favor of vivartavāda (appearance-causation). Understanding pariṇāmavāda requires understanding both what it claims and the Advaita argument against it. Build with [Vivartavāda](vivartavada.md).

## The Rival Pair: Pariṇāmavāda vs. Vivartavāda

| Feature | **Pariṇāmavāda** (Sāṃkhya / Viśiṣṭādvaita) | **Vivartavāda** (Advaita) |
|---------|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| **What the cause does** | Actually transforms into the effect | Remains entirely unchanged |
| **What the effect is** | A real, new modification of the cause | An appearance on the unchanged cause |
| **Paradigm example** | Milk → curd (curd is real; milk-state is gone) | Rope → snake (snake is appearance only; rope unchanged) |
| **Causal status of world** | Pāramārthika / vyāvahārika real (genuinely existent) | Mithyā (appearance on Brahman substratum) |
| **The cause after effect** | Transformed — cannot return to prior state via cognition | Unchanged — substratum fully recovered on sublation |
| **Liberation mechanism** | Isolation of Puruṣa from Prakṛti (Sāṃkhya); realization of Brahman-as-ātman (Viśiṣṭādvaita) | Brahma-jñāna dissolves the world-appearance; unchanged Brahman recognized |
| **Primary proponents** | Īśvarakṛṣṇa (Sāṃkhya); Rāmānuja (brahma-pariṇāmavāda, Viśiṣṭādvaita) | Śaṅkara, Gauḍapāda (Advaita) |

## Etymology

From Sanskrit *pariṇāma* (transformation, modification, change of form — from *pari*, around/completely + *nāma*, from root *nam*, to bend, to change; thus: a thorough/complete bending/changing) + *vāda* (theory, thesis — from root *vad*, to speak). Literally: the theory of real transformation; the thesis that the cause actually changes into the effect.

*Pariṇāma* in Sanskrit also carries the sense of ripening, maturation — the way a mango ripens from unripe to ripe. This is not a mere appearance of ripeness; the mango genuinely changes its chemical constitution. Pariṇāmavāda generalizes this to all causation and, in Sāṃkhya and Viśiṣṭādvaita, to the cosmological causation of Prakṛti or Brahman becoming the world.

## The Paradigm: Milk Becoming Curd (Dugdha-Dadhi Dṛṣṭānta)

The standard illustration of pariṇāmavāda is the transformation of milk (dugdha) into curd (dadhi):

1. **The milk is the upādāna-kāraṇa** (material cause) — the substance out of which the effect is made.
2. **The curd is the real effect** — it is genuinely new as a state; curd has properties that milk does not have (different texture, taste, digestibility, biological behavior).
3. **The milk-as-milk is gone** — after the transformation, there is no pure milk in the vessel; the substance has actually changed its state. You cannot recover the milk by *thinking* about it differently.
4. **The transformation is irreversible by cognition** — this is the key contrast with vivartavāda: you cannot dissolve the curd-appearance and find the original milk by gaining better knowledge. The transformation was real.

This is why pariṇāmavāda implies the genuine reality of the effect — if the world is a real pariṇāma of Brahman or Prakṛti, then the world has its own genuine reality and is not mithyā.

## Sāṃkhya's Prakṛti-Pariṇāmavāda

In the Sāṃkhya-Yoga darśana (Sāṃkhyakārikā 16, Īśvarakṛṣṇa), pariṇāmavāda is grounded in *satkāryavāda* — the doctrine that the effect (kārya) pre-exists in the cause (kāraṇa) in potential form:

**Satkāryavāda argument:** Why does oil come from sesame and not from sand? Because oil is already present in potential in sesame but not in sand. The cause contains the effect; production is the actualization of what was latent, not the creation of something entirely new (which would be asatkāryavāda — the Buddhist and Nyāya position that the effect is genuinely new).

**Prakṛti's modifications:** From *Prakṛti* (the primordial, triguṇa material principle), the following cascade of real transformations occurs:
- Mahat / Buddhi (cosmic intelligence)
- Ahaṃkāra (cosmic individuation)
- Manas (mind), five jñānendriyas (sense-capacities), five karmendriyas (action-capacities)
- Five tanmātrās (subtle elements)
- Five mahābhūtas (gross elements)

Each of these is a real pariṇāma — Prakṛti actually modifying itself through successive states. Puruṣa (pure consciousness) is not involved in any of this transformation; it is the witness (sākṣin) who, by proximity to Prakṛti, appears to be involved. Liberation (kaivalya) in Sāṃkhya-Yoga is the recognition that Puruṣa was never actually transformed or bound — it was always the uninvolved witness.

Note: in Sāṃkhya, the pariṇāmavāda concerns Prakṛti, not Puruṣa. Puruṣa itself does not transform. There is thus a structural parallel with Advaita: the pure consciousness (Puruṣa/Brahman) does not transform. The difference is that in Sāṃkhya, the world is a real transformation of a second eternal substance (Prakṛti), while in Advaita, there is no second eternal substance — only Brahman — so the world's causation must be vivarta, not pariṇāma.

## Viśiṣṭādvaita's Brahma-Pariṇāmavāda

Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita (Śrī Bhāṣya 2.1.26) develops a distinctive form of pariṇāmavāda — *brahma-pariṇāmavāda* — in which Brahman itself is the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) of the world:

**The Śarīra-Ātman (Body-Soul) Model:** The world and all jīvas are the *śarīra* (body) of Brahman, who is the *ātman* (inner controller) of the whole. Brahman pervades, sustains, and controls everything from within. The world is not a separate substance but the dependent body of the one Brahman.

**How it is pariṇāmavāda:** The world is a *real* modification — Brahman's body actually transforms through creation, sustenance, and dissolution. The jīvas and the world are real, not mithyā. They are genuinely different from Brahman (viśeṣaṇa — qualifying attributes), yet inseparable from Brahman (aprthaksiddha — incapable of existing separately). This is why the school is named Viśiṣṭādvaita: qualified (viśiṣṭa) non-duality — not simple monism (Advaita) but unity-in-difference.

**Rāmānuja's critique of vivartavāda:** Rāmānuja explicitly argues that vivartavāda is philosophically incoherent: if the world were merely an appearance (vivarta) of Brahman with no real causal relation, there would be no explanation for why this appearance arises (not any appearance, but *this* world with *these* features), no account of how Brahman remains unchanged while the appearance exists in it, and no intelligible sense in which the substratum (Brahman) is the cause at all. Real causation requires real transformation.

## Advaita's Rejection: Why Brahman Cannot Be the Pariṇāmin

Śaṅkara's argument (Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya 2.1.26–27) against brahma-pariṇāmavāda rests on Brahman's essential characteristics:

**Argument from nirguṇatva (absence of qualities):**
Real transformation presupposes qualities that can change (milk's fluidity changes; clay's formlessness changes). Brahman is nirguṇa — without qualities. A qualityless entity has nothing that could change. Therefore Brahman cannot be a pariṇāmin (transformer).

**Argument from nirvikāratva (absence of modification):**
*Vikāra* (modification) is definitionally what happens to a pariṇāmī cause. Brahman is explicitly nirvikāra — declared by Śruti to be unchanging. To ascribe pariṇāma to Brahman contradicts Śruti's most direct declarations.

**The soteriology argument:**
If Brahman pariṇāmed into the world, the pre-creation pure Brahman would no longer exist — it would have become the world (as milk becomes curd and the milk-state is gone). There would be no unchanged Brahman to realize at liberation. Mokṣa as the recognition "I am Brahman" would be impossible — the Brahman that was there before the world is no longer there. Liberation requires an unchanged, eternally available pāramārthika Brahman, which only vivartavāda can provide.

**The causality circle problem:**
If Brahman is the material cause of the world and the world is Brahman-transformed, then Brahman knowing the world would be a case of a transformation knowing its own transforming cause — creating paradoxes about the knowing relation that Advaita's vivartavāda avoids by keeping Brahman entirely outside the world's causal structure.

## Pariṇāmavāda and the Mithyā Question

The most important consequence of the Advaita-pariṇāmavāda debate is about the ontological status of the world:

| Position | World's status | Why |
|----------|---------------|-----|
| **Sāṃkhya pariṇāmavāda** | Real (real Prakṛti-modification) | Prakṛti is eternal; its transformations are genuine; Puruṣa remains untouched |
| **Viśiṣṭādvaita brahma-pariṇāmavāda** | Real (Brahman's body) | Real causal relation between Brahman-ātman and world-śarīra; jīvas are genuinely distinct from Brahman |
| **Advaita vivartavāda** | Mithyā (appearance on Brahman) | Brahman is nirguṇa, nirvikāra — cannot genuinely transform; the world's arising is vivarta; the world depends on Brahman but Brahman does not depend on the world |

If pariṇāmavāda is correct for the Brahman→world relation, the world is real and mithyā is false. If vivartavāda is correct, the world is mithyā and liberation is possible by cognition alone. This is the deepest stake of the rival_view_pair.

## Cross-References
- [Vivartavāda](vivartavada.md) — the Advaita rival; the theory that the world is an appearance rather than a real transformation of Brahman; build with this file as rival_view_pair
- [Mithyā](mithya.md) — what the world is if vivartavāda is correct; what it is NOT if pariṇāmavāda is correct; the ontological stake of the rival pair
- [Pāramārthika](paramarthika.md) — the level at which Brahman alone exists; only vivartavāda is compatible with Brahman alone being pāramārthika; pariṇāmavāda implies the world shares real status with Brahman
- [Vyāvahārika](vyavaharika.md) — in both Viśiṣṭādvaita and Sāṃkhya, the world is at minimum vyāvahārika-real; in Advaita, vyāvahārika reality is compatible with mithyātva (real-as-appearance) — the level itself is not the dispute
- [Adhyāsa](adhyasa.md) — in Advaita, what makes the world appear at all is adhyāsa (superimposition); in pariṇāmavāda, there is no adhyāsa — the world is really there because it really came from a real transformation
- [Bādha / Bādhita](badha-badhita.md) — the sublation mechanism; sublation (bādha) is appropriate to mithyā (the vivartavāda world); in pariṇāmavāda, liberation is not sublation of the world but either isolation (Sāṃkhya) or recognition of the ātman-śarīra relationship (Viśiṣṭādvaita) — the mechanism differs fundamentally

## Audience Metaphor

A potter's clay becomes a pot. This is pariṇāmavāda. The clay actually changes — it is no longer merely clay; it is now a pot. The clay-as-mere-clay no longer exists in that state. The pot is a real new object, a genuine modification of the clay. Now compare this to the rope-snake (vivartavāda): the rope does not become the snake. The snake appears in the rope without the rope changing. The rope-as-rope still fully exists after the snake-appearance. There is no new product — only an apparent one. Sāṃkhya says Prakṛti (the primordial nature) is the clay — it really becomes the world through successive modifications. Viśiṣṭādvaita says Brahman is like the clay — it becomes the world as a real modification (while remaining Brahman as the ātman of that world-body). Advaita says Brahman is the rope — it appears as the world without any change, and the world's reality is borrowed, dependent, sublatable. The real question is: what kind of causation can a nirguṇa, unchanging Brahman have? Advaita says: only vivarta — appearance without transformation.

## Citations

1. [Sāṃkhyakārikā](/references/samkhya-karika.md) 16 (Īśvarakṛṣṇa) — satkāryavāda: the effect (kārya) pre-exists in the cause (kāraṇa); nothing can be produced that is not already present in potential form; this is the metaphysical grounding of Sāṃkhya pariṇāmavāda; Prakṛti's modifications (vikṛti) are real transformations of a single primordial substance
2. [Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya](/references/brahmasutra-bhasya.md) 2.1.26–27 (Śaṅkara) — the pivotal Advaita critique: a nirguṇa, nirvikāra Brahman cannot be the upādāna-kāraṇa (material cause) of a real transformation; the 'effect' (world) must therefore be vivarta (appearance), not pariṇāma (real transformation); Śaṅkara here defines the Advaita position against Sāṃkhya
3. Śrī Bhāṣya 2.1.26 (Rāmānuja) — brahma-pariṇāmavāda: Brahman, along with its body (the world and jīvas), genuinely transforms; the world is not mithyā but the real body-state of Brahman; the Viśiṣṭādvaita defense of pariṇāmavāda against Advaita's vivartavāda; Rāmānuja's explicit argument against the vivartavāda position as philosophically incoherent
