---
type: Concept
bundle: vedanta-epistemology
bundle_version: "0.3.0"
id: badha-badhita
title: "Bādha / Bādhita — Sublation and the Sublated"
iast: "bādha / bādhita"
devanagari: "बाध / बाधित"
description: "Sublation and the Sublated. Not refutation, not contradiction."
darshana:
  - Advaita Vedānta
school_scope: "Advaita Vedānta (bādha and bādhyatva — sulatability — are the defining Advaita criteria for mithyā; the concept appears in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology as bādhita-anumāna — an inference cancelled by perception — but the Advaita usage extends it into a full ontological criterion; Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita reject the application of bādhyatva to the world as a whole, since they hold the world to be genuinely real)"
text_source: "Vedāntasāra 55–57 (Sadānanda — explicit definition: mithyātvam = traikālika-bādha-pratiyogitva, being the counterpositive of sublation at all three times); Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya 1.1.1 Introduction (Śaṅkara — adhyāsa and its bādha by correct cognition); Pañcadaśī 1.7–9 (Vidyāraṇya — three-level ontology with bādhyatva as the criterion separating levels)"
tags:
  - advaita-vedanta
  - epistemology
  - ontology
  - mithya
  - adhyasa
  - three-levels-of-reality
  - tier-2
  - high
not:
  - term: "refutation"
    why: "logical refutation (in Western philosophy and Nyāya tarka) targets a *proposition* and shows it to be logically false, self-contradictory, or unsupported by valid inference; bādha targets a *cognition* or *apparent object* and shows it to have been a case of mithyā — an appearance on a real substratum that is now revealed; refutation leaves the proposition negated (as false); bādha leaves the substratum intact and simply cancels the identification of the appearance with it; the snake is not shown to be logically contradictory — it is shown to have been a rope all along; no inference was involved on either side"
    instead: "Keep Sublation and the Sublated untranslated; do not substitute the English term."
  - term: "contradiction"
    why: "logical contradiction (A and not-A cannot both be true) is a formal-logical relation between propositions; bādha is an experiential-cognitive event in which a prior cognition is superseded by a more adequate one, revealing the substratum; the snake-cognition and the rope-cognition are not logically contradictory statements but successive perceptual cognitions about the same locus; the Advaita framework explicitly handles the status of the bādhita-object as neither-sat-nor-asat (mithyā), which is not the same as a logical contradiction"
  - term: "falsification (Popperian)"
    why: "Popperian falsification concerns the logical structure of scientific theories: a theory is falsified when an observation contradicts its prediction; bādha is not a matter of empirical prediction and observation but of ontological-epistemological correction — of a prior cognitive misidentification being revealed as such; falsificationism operates within the vyāvahārika frame (science is entirely vyāvahārika); bādha at the pāramārthika level (brahma-jñāna as the bādha of avidyā) is not a scientific event at all"
  - term: "overriding belief (epistemological belief revision)"
    why: "in contemporary epistemology, belief revision (Gettier cases, defeaters, undercutting vs. rebutting defeaters) concerns the rational updating of a belief system when new evidence arrives; bādha is stronger than belief revision — it does not leave the prior 'belief' in a revised form but cancels the apparent reality of its object; after bādha of the snake-cognition, there is no revised belief about the snake; there is no snake to revise beliefs about; the framework is ontological, not doxastic"
  - term: "negation (logical)"
    why: "logical negation (~P) is a formal operator that produces a proposition of opposite truth-value; bādha does not negate the snake-cognition in this formal sense; it reveals that the apparent object (snake) was all along the substratum (rope) in disguise; the snake-object is not assigned the truth-value 'false' — it is revealed to have been mithyā, which is a third category (neither-sat-nor-asat) not captured by truth-functional negation"
  - term: "cancellation (as sufficient)"
    why: "while bādha is sometimes translated as 'cancellation,' this misses the essential structure: what makes bādha philosophically significant in Advaita is the persistence of the substratum through the cancellation; 'cancellation' by itself could suggest the object simply ceases (asat — was never there); Advaita's point is that the rope (substratum) was always there and is what the snake appeared in — bādha reveals this, it does not merely cancel the snake-cognition into a void"
related:
  - /concepts/mithya.md
  - /concepts/adhyasa.md
  - /concepts/pratibhasika.md
  - /concepts/vyavaharika.md
  - /concepts/paramarthika.md
  - /concepts/vivartavada.md
  - /concepts/svatahpramanya.md
timestamp: "2026-06-20"
okf_version: "0.2"
license: "CC BY-SA 4.0"
---

# Bādha / Bādhita — बाध / बाधित

**Not:** refutation, contradiction, falsification (Popperian), overriding belief (epistemological belief revision), negation (logical), cancellation (as sufficient)

**Bādha** is the cognitive-ontological event of sublation — the cancellation of a prior erroneous cognition by a more adequate one that reveals the substratum. **Bādhita** is the result — the sublated cognition or its apparent object, now revealed to have been a mithyā appearance rather than an independent reality. Together, bādha (the act) and bādhita (the sublated) define the most precise criterion for mithyā in Advaita Vedānta.

The technical definition (Vedāntasāra 55–57, Sadānanda):

> *Mithyātvaṃ traikālika-bādha-pratiyogitvaṃ*
> Mithyātva (the property of being mithyā) is being the counterpositive of sublation at all three times.

What can be sublated — what *is* the counterpositive of a (possible or actual) bādha — is mithyā. What cannot be sublated at any time in any state is pāramārthika. This is the formal definition that ties bādha to the entire three-level ontology.

## The Structure of Bādha

Every bādha event has three moments:

| Moment | What happens | Example (snake-rope) | Example (world-Brahman) |
|--------|-------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| **Prior cognition** | An erroneous cognition of an apparent object | "This is a snake" | "I am a body-mind in a real, independent world" |
| **Corrective cognition** | A more adequate cognition that reveals the substratum | "This is a rope" (on seeing properly) | Brahma-jñāna — "I am Brahman" (via Mahāvākya) |
| **Bādha** | The prior cognition is cancelled; the apparent object's claim to independent reality collapses | The snake-appearance dissolves; no snake remains | The world's apparent independent reality is dissolved; Brahman alone remains |

The essential feature of genuine bādha: **the substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) persists unchanged through the event.** The rope was always the rope. Brahman was always Brahman. The bādhita object (snake, world-as-independent) was never an independent reality — it was an appearance *in* the substratum.

## Etymology

*Bādha* — from Sanskrit root *bādh*, to obstruct, to trouble, to cancel, to invalidate. In the verbal form, *bādhate* means "obstructs," "cancels," "invalidates." In epistemological usage, it refers to the invalidating of a prior cognition by a subsequent one.

*Bādhita* — past passive participle of *bādh*: that which has been cancelled, sublated, invalidated. The bādhita object is not destroyed (that would be *naṣṭa*) — it is revealed to have been a mithyā appearance.

*Bādhyatva* — the abstract property of being bādhya (sublatable). This is the property that defines mithyā: what is bādhya is not absolutely real.

## Bādha at Each Ontological Level

The three-level ontology is constituted precisely by differential bādhyatva:

| Level | Term | Bādhita by | What persists |
|-------|------|-----------|---------------|
| Apparent | Prātibhāsika | Ordinary corrective cognition (better light, waking from dream) | The vyāvahārika substratum (rope, waking world) |
| Empirical | Vyāvahārika | Brahma-jñāna alone (liberation) | Pāramārthika Brahman |
| Absolute | Pāramārthika | Nothing — trikālābādhita | N/A — no substratum above Brahman |

This table is the three-level ontology *read as a bādha-hierarchy*. Vidyāraṇya (Pañcadaśī 1.7–9) generates the three-level taxonomy by asking: what bādhita-s this level, and what remains after? The answers define each level.

## Bādha and the Snake-Rope Example

The canonical illustration of bādha at the prātibhāsika level:

1. **Before bādha:** The observer sees a snake in the rope. The snake-cognition is a real cognitive event — producing fear, behavioral response, real experience.
2. **The bādha event:** Better light; the observer looks carefully. "It is a rope."
3. **After bādha:**
   - The snake-cognition is *bādhita* — it is cancelled; the snake is recognized as never having been real as an independent entity.
   - The rope (substratum) is revealed: it was always a rope; it was never a snake; it was not changed by the snake-appearance.
   - The snake does not receive a new truth-value of 'false' — it is recognized as *mithyā*: it had the appearance of reality while appearing, and its substratum (the rope) is real, but the snake itself as an independent entity was never there.

The snake-rope bādha is not: (a) logical refutation of the snake-proposition; (b) scientific falsification of a snake-hypothesis; (c) belief revision upon receiving new evidence. It is the *revelation of the substratum* by a corrective cognition.

## Bādha and Adhyāsa

Bādha is the *removal* of what adhyāsa imposed. The structural relationship:

- **Adhyāsa** (superimposition): snake-properties are imposed on the rope; ātman-properties are imposed on anātman (body-mind); the world is misidentified as independently real.
- **Bādha** (sublation): the corrective cognition removes the superimposition; rope is seen as rope; Brahman is recognized as Brahman; the world's independent-reality status collapses.

The two concepts are causally paired: adhyāsa creates the mithyā appearance; bādha dissolves it. This is why the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya opens with the Adhyāsa-Bhāṣya — because Śaṅkara's entire enterprise is to identify what is superimposed (adhyasta) and specify what will remove the superimposition (bādha). The philosophical goal of Advaita is precisely the bādha of the root adhyāsa (the identification of self with body-mind-world complex).

## Bādha at the Liberation Level

The highest application of bādha is the removal of the fundamental avidyā (nescience) that generates the vyāvahārika appearance:

- **What is bādhita:** The apparent independent reality of the world and the individuality of the jīva — the deep "I am a finite being in a real external world" identification.
- **What produces the bādha:** Brahma-jñāna — the direct recognition "aham brahmāsmi" (I am Brahman) or "tat tvam asi" (that you are), delivered by Mahāvākyas and internalized through śravaṇa (hearing), manana (reflection), nididhyāsana (meditation).
- **What remains after bādha:** Nirguṇa Brahman — unchanged, self-luminous, as it always was; the "I am a finite being" was the snake; Brahman is the rope.
- **What does not happen:** The world does not literally disappear for the jīvanmukta. The jīvanmukta still sees the world — but the identification ("this world is independently real and I am a separate entity within it") is bādhita. The jīvanmukta sees the snake but knows it is a rope.

## Bādhyatva as the Criterion for Mithyā

The Vedāntasāra definition — mithyātva = traikālika-bādha-pratiyogitva — encodes an important logical structure:

A thing is mithyā if and only if there is a possible (actual or counterfactual) bādha of which it would be the counterpositive — i.e., if a bādha-event would reveal it to have been a mithyā appearance.

This captures:
- **The snake** is mithyā because the rope-cognition bādhita-s it.
- **The world** is mithyā because brahma-jñāna bādhita-s its apparent independent reality.
- **The sky-lotus** (ākāśa-puṣpa — a flower in the sky, the classic asat example) is not mithyā but asat — it is not sublated; it never had even apparent reality.
- **Brahman** is not mithyā — no bādha is possible for it; it is trikālābādhita.

The criterion thus carves out the middle category between sat (pāramārthika) and asat (absolute non-being) — which is exactly the logical space that mithyā occupies.

## What Bādha Is Not

Three common confusions to block:

**Bādha ≠ The object ceasing to exist:** After the bādha of the snake, the rope still exists. After brahma-jñāna, the world still appears to the jīvanmukta. Bādha cancels the *claim to independent reality*, not the appearance itself. The appearance continues in the substratum; only the misidentification is dissolved.

**Bādha ≠ Logical defeat in debate:** The Nyāya concept of *bādhita-anumāna* (a defeated inference — one whose conclusion is cancelled by a perceptual counter-instance) is a different, narrower use of the same root. The Advaita use is broader and ontological: it applies to the cognitive event by which any level of mithyā reality is superseded by revelation of a higher substratum.

**Bādha ≠ The sublating cognition being infallible:** The rope-cognition can itself be subsequently bādhita (the rope is itself vyāvahārika and mithyā from the pāramārthika standpoint). Each bādha reveals a substratum, but the substratum at each level is itself potentially bādhya at the next level. Only the ultimate substratum — Brahman — is trikālābādhita. This is the cascade structure of the Advaita ontology read through bādha.

## Cross-References
- [Mithyā](mithya.md) — mithyātva is formally defined via bādhyatva; the two are co-defined; to understand mithyā is to understand bādha
- [Adhyāsa](adhyasa.md) — bādha is the removal of adhyāsa; paired concepts governing the structure of error and its correction in Advaita
- [Prātibhāsika](pratibhasika.md) — the level at which bādha is most immediately visible; snake-rope is the paradigm bādha event
- [Vyāvahārika](vyavaharika.md) — the level whose apparent independent reality is bādhita by brahma-jñāna; vyāvahārika reality persists after bādha as appearance
- [Pāramārthika](paramarthika.md) — the trikālābādhita level; what bādha always reveals and what no bādha can touch
- [Vivartavāda](vivartavada.md) — vivartavāda explains *why* the world is bādhya: because it is a vivarta (appearance) on an unchanged Brahman, not a real pariṇāma; bādha-structure requires vivartavāda as its cosmological ground
- [Svataḥprāmāṇya](svatahpramanya.md) — the self-validity of knowledge; in Advaita, the corrective cognition that produces bādha (brahma-jñāna) is itself svataḥprāmāṇya — self-certifying, not requiring external validation

## Audience Metaphor

You are looking at a photograph on your wall. In dim light you are convinced it is a window — you reach out to open it. Then you turn on the lamp. The window-cognition is bādhita: it does not crumble logically, it is not refuted by a counter-argument, it is not falsified by a scientific test. The wall is simply revealed. The wall was always there — your window-cognition was an appearance *in* the wall, not a product of the wall. The wall emerges from the episode unchanged. That is bādha: a prior cognition of a mithyā object is cancelled by a revealing cognition, while the substratum (the wall — or ultimately, Brahman) stands revealed as what was always really there. The sublated (bādhita) object — the window — was real enough to make you reach out; but it was not real in the way the wall is real.

## Citations

1. [Vedāntasāra](/references/vedantasara.md) 55–57 (Sadānanda) — the technical definition of mithyātva as traikālika-bādha-pratiyogitva: being that which is the counterpositive (pratiyogin) of sublation (bādha) across all three times (trikāla); the world is mithyā because it will be bādhita by brahma-jñāna; this is the most formally precise statement of the bādha-criterion
2. [Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya](/references/brahmasutra-bhasya.md) 1.1.1 Introduction — the opening bhāṣya (Śaṅkara's Adhyāsa-Bhāṣya): definition of adhyāsa and analysis of how correct cognition (samyag-jñāna) bādhita-s the superimposition; this is the foundational text for the bādha-analysis of adhyāsa
3. [Pañcadaśī](/references/panchadashi.md) 1.7–9 (Vidyāraṇya) — three-level ontology explicitly defined by differential bādhyatva: prātibhāsika is sublated by corrective perception; vyāvahārika is sublated by brahma-jñāna; pāramārthika Brahman is bādhya by nothing (trikālābādhita); bādhyatva is the principle that separates all three levels
