---
type: Concept
bundle: vedanta-epistemology
bundle_version: "0.3.0"
id: adhyasa
title: "Adhyāsa — Superimposition"
iast: "adhyāsa"
devanagari: "अध्यास"
description: "Superimposition. Not mistake, not misperception."
darshana:
  - Advaita Vedānta
school_scope: "Advaita Vedānta (Śaṅkara's Adhyāsa-bhāṣya is the foundational text; the concept is specific to Advaita in its epistemological-ontological function — the structural condition for saṃsāra)"
text_source: "Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya — Adhyāsa-bhāṣya (Introduction) (Śaṅkara); Vivekacūḍāmaṇi vv.131–137 (Śaṅkara)"
tags:
  - advaita-vedanta
  - epistemology
  - superimposition
  - avidya
  - samsara
  - tier-2
  - critical
not:
  - term: "mistake"
    why: "a mistake is a cognitive error about a particular object, corrected by re-observation; adhyāsa is a structural overlay operative at the level of consciousness itself, not a propositional error that fresh perception can revise"
    instead: "Keep Superimposition untranslated; do not substitute the English term."
  - term: "misperception"
    why: "misperception implies the perceptual apparatus failed; adhyāsa occurs even when the senses function correctly — the problem is not a broken lens but the witness-consciousness being identified with the apparatus that is doing the looking"
  - term: "confusion"
    why: "confusion is a recoverable disorientation; adhyāsa is anādi (beginningless) — it does not arise from a prior state of clarity that was then disrupted; there was never a pre-adhyāsic moment in the jīva's history"
  - term: "projection"
    why: "projection in psychology (Freud) is a defense mechanism by which one's own qualities are attributed to others; adhyāsa is bidirectional and structural — it is the mutual superimposition of Ātman and anātman that constitutes the very framework of empirical selfhood, not a contingent psychological defense"
  - term: "category error"
    why: "Ryle's category error is a conceptual mistake about what logical type an entity belongs to; adhyāsa is not a conceptual mistake made by a pre-existing clear subject — it is the operation that produces the apparent subject (jīva) in the first place; the subject is itself an effect of adhyāsa, not its agent"
  - term: "illusion"
    why: "'illusion' implies the experience is subjectively false or feels wrong; adhyāsa is phenomenologically seamless — the identification of the body with the Self does not feel wrong, it feels like ordinary experience; calling it illusion imports a Western phenomenology of error that doesn't fit"
  - term: "delusion"
    why: "delusion implies pathology or departure from a norm; adhyāsa is the universal structural condition of all unenlightened beings — it is not abnormal but the baseline of saṃsāric existence; only jñāna (liberating knowledge) removes it"
  - term: "superimposition (in Western philosophy)"
    why: "in some Western uses, 'superimposition' means one conceptual framework overlaid on another (Kuhn's paradigm layer); Śaṅkara's adhyāsa is an ontological-epistemological operation — the non-self literally appears AS the Self and vice versa, not merely a conceptual overlay"
related:
  - /concepts/mithya.md
  - /concepts/avidya.md
  - /concepts/pratyaksha.md
  - /concepts/badha-badhita.md
  - /concepts/shabda-pramana.md
timestamp: "2026-06-20"
okf_version: "0.2"
license: "CC BY-SA 4.0"
---

# Adhyāsa — अध्यास

**Not:** mistake, misperception, confusion, projection, category error, illusion, delusion, superimposition (in Western philosophy)

Adhyāsa is the mutual superimposition of Ātman (the witness-Self, pure consciousness) and anātman (the not-Self: body, senses, mind, ego) by which each appears to have the properties of the other. It is Śaṅkara's technical term for the foundational cognitive-ontological error that makes saṃsāra possible — not a particular mistake but the structural condition within which all particular experience occurs.

Śaṅkara defines it in the opening lines of the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya (the Adhyāsa-bhāṣya): *"Adhyāsa is the appearance of something remembered in something present — the appearance of a previously cognized form in something other than what it is, like the appearance of silver in mother-of-pearl."* (*smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadr̥ṣṭāvabhāsaḥ* — Adhyāsa-bhāṣya, opening.)

The example: you see a shining disc on the ground and cognize it as silver — what is actually present (the *pratyakṣa* object) is nacre (mother of pearl); the form of silver is superimposed from memory. This is ordinary error. Adhyāsa as it applies to Ātman-anātman is structurally similar but operates at a far deeper level — the superimposition constitutes the very framework of ordinary selfhood.

## Etymology

From Sanskrit *adhi* (upon, over, on top of — prefix indicating position or superiority) + *āsa* (being placed, sitting, appearing — from root *ās*, to sit, to be positioned). Literally: being placed upon, that which sits on top of — what appears *on top of* or *in* something that is actually other than it.

The verbal root *adhyās-* (to superimpose) also gives *adhyāsita* (that which has been superimposed) and *adhyāsin* (one who superimposes). The circularity embedded in the term: the *adhyāsin* (the jīva who performs adhyāsa) is itself a product of adhyāsa — the ego that appears to do the superimposing is already constituted by superimposition.

## Śaṅkara's Definition — Four Analytical Points

The Adhyāsa-bhāṣya introduction is the most technically precise text on adhyāsa. Four features of Śaṅkara's definition:

### 1. Smṛtirūpa (Memory-Form)
What is superimposed is a *smṛtirūpa* — a form retained in memory or cognitive tendency, not a purely fresh perception. In the nacre-silver case, the form of silver is carried from prior encounters with silver; it appears *in* the nacre. In the Ātman case, the ego-sense ("I am this body, this mind") is built from the accumulated cognitive tendency to take the body-mind complex as oneself.

### 2. Paratra (In Something Other)
The superimposed form appears *paratra* — in something else, in something that is genuinely other than the superimposed object. Silver appears *in* nacre; body-mind-ego appears *in* Ātman. The substratum (the nacre, the Ātman) is real; what appears *on* it is the superimposition.

### 3. The Bidirectional Structure (Mutual Superimposition)
Śaṅkara specifies that the Ātman-anātman adhyāsa is *itaretara-adhyāsa* — mutual superimposition. Two directions operate simultaneously:

- **Anātman-on-Ātman:** Body-properties (birth, growth, hunger, fatigue, pain, death) appear to belong to the Ātman. "I am tired." "I am old." "I will die." These are body-properties attributed to the witness-consciousness that in fact has none of these properties.

- **Ātman-on-anātman:** Consciousness, existence, and the sense of being-a-subject appear to belong to the body-mind-ego complex. "The body is conscious," "the mind is aware." Consciousness is Ātman's nature; its apparent presence in the body-mind is a reverse superimposition.

This bidirectional structure produces the *ahaṃkāra* (ego) — the sense of being a specific, bounded, conscious individual — which is the condensed result of both directions of superimposition operating together.

### 4. Anādi (Beginningless)
Adhyāsa is *anādi* — it has no beginning in time. Śaṅkara addresses the obvious objection: if adhyāsa is an error, who made it and when? The answer: the jīva who would have made it is itself constituted by adhyāsa. There is no prior moment of clarity from which the error departed. Adhyāsa and the saṃsāric order co-arise; asking when it began is like asking when the rope became a snake — the snake never had a beginning because it never was.

## Adhyāsa vs. Ordinary Error

Adhyāsa is analogous to but importantly different from *bhrānti* (ordinary perceptual error) in three ways:

**Scope:** Bhrānti is particular — the silver-in-nacre error concerns a particular shining disc on a particular day. Adhyāsa is universal and constant — the body-mind-Self confusion operates in every moment of ordinary experience without exception.

**Correction:** Bhrānti is corrected by re-observation (you look closely and see nacre). Adhyāsa is not corrected by any perceptual act or any ordinary pramāṇa-result. Even the philosopher who has correctly understood Advaita doctrine continues to say "I am hungry," "I am tired" — *vyāvahārika* identification persists until *aparokṣānubhūti* (direct, immediate realization of Ātman), not just intellectual knowledge.

**Operator:** Bhrānti has a clear subject who errs (the person who saw silver). Adhyāsa produces its own apparent subject (the jīva) — the "one who" is in adhyāsa is itself a product of adhyāsa.

## Adhyāsa and the Pramāṇas

A crucial implication for the epistemology of this bundle: all ordinary pramāṇas (pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, arthāpatti, anupalabdhi) operate *within* the frame of adhyāsa. They presuppose a pramātā (knower) who is already identified with the empirical mind-body — a pramātā who is already in adhyāsa.

This is why ordinary pramāṇas can generate valid empirical knowledge while being unable to produce liberating knowledge of Brahman (brahma-jñāna). They operate inside the structure they would need to dissolve. To use Śaṅkara's own framing (Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya 2.1.14): the pramāṇas are valid in their domain, but their domain is the domain *constituted by* adhyāsa. For the knowledge that removes adhyāsa, only śabda as apauruṣeya Śruti can serve — because Śruti alone is not produced by a pramātā already situated within adhyāsa.

This is the deepest argument for why Vedānta inquiry is necessary and why it cannot be replaced by rational investigation alone: rationality and perception are tools whose user is already the thing that needs to be understood.

## The Liberation Connection

Adhyāsa is removed by *jñāna* — specifically by *aparokṣānubhūti* (direct, non-mediated realization of Ātman as Brahman). This removal is not gradual improvement but sudden reversal — the rope is seen, and the snake dissolves. The snake does not become slightly less snake-like over time.

The technical term for this removal is *bādha* (sublation — see badha-badhita.md): the prior cognition (body = Self) is overridden by the new cognition (Ātman alone is real; the body is mithyā superimposition). Post-sublation, the body continues to function, but the *adhyāsa* (the identification, the "I am this body" claim) is gone. This is the state of the *jīvanmukta* — liberated while living.

## Cross-References
- [Mithyā](mithya.md) — the ontological status of what adhyāsa presents; the superimposed (silver, the empirical world) is mithyā — neither fully real nor fully non-existent; build with this file (CRITICAL_pairs)
- [Avidyā (epistemological)](avidya.md) — adhyāsa is avidyā in its operational, functional form; avidyā is the ignorance, adhyāsa is what that ignorance produces as cognitive-experiential structure
- [Pratyakṣa](pratyaksha.md) — the pramāṇa within whose operation adhyāsa is most visible; all "perception of self as body" is adhyāsic; pratyakṣa operates within the adhyāsic frame
- [Bādha / Bādhita](badha-badhita.md) — sublation; the cognitive event that removes adhyāsa; liberating knowledge (brahma-jñāna) is the bādha of the adhyāsa-cognition
- [Śabda / Āgama (pramāṇa)](shabda-pramana.md) — the only pramāṇa capable of operating outside the adhyāsic frame (apauruṣeya); the instrument of adhyāsa-removal
- [Aparokṣānubhūti](aparoksha-anubhuti.md) — the direct realization that removes adhyāsa; the terminal event in the Advaita epistemological path

## Audience Metaphor

Like wearing glasses you've forgotten you have on — not prescription glasses that blur things, but lenses that add a layer to everything you see: this body is you, this mind is you, this ego is you. The lenses don't distort specific objects incorrectly; they shape the entire field of experience. You can correctly identify chairs and trees and people while wearing them. The problem is not that they make you confused about chairs — it's that you've forgotten they're there, and everything you know yourself to be is shaped by the fact that you're wearing them.

## Citations

1. [Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya](/references/brahmasutra-bhasya.md) — Adhyāsa-bhāṣya — Śaṅkara's introduction to the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya; the most precise technical definition of adhyāsa in the Advaita corpus; definition, the nacre-silver example, mutual superimposition, the role of adhyāsa in making Vedānta inquiry necessary
2. [Vivekacūḍāmaṇi](/references/vivekachudamani.md) vv.131–137 — Śaṅkara on adhyāsa as the co-mingling (mithyāmadhyāropita) of Ātman and anātman; the body-mind-intellect complex taken as 'I'
3. [Pañcadaśī](/references/panchadashi.md) 1.7–8 (Vidyāraṇya) — adhyāsa producing ahaṃkāra (ego) and the cycle of saṃsāra
4. [Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya](/references/brahmasutra-bhasya.md) 2.1.14 — Śaṅkara on why pramāṇas operate within the frame of adhyāsa and therefore cannot dissolve it
