---
type: Concept
bundle: vedanta-epistemology
bundle_version: "0.3.0"
id: arthapatti
title: "Arthāpatti — Postulation to Resolve an Inexplicable Fact"
iast: "arthāpatti"
devanagari: "अर्थापत्ति"
description: "Postulation to Resolve an Inexplicable Fact. Not inference to the best explanation, not abductive reasoning."
darshana:
  - Advaita Vedānta
  - Mīmāṃsā
school_scope: "Advaita Vedānta + Mīmāṃsā (both accept as independent pramāṇa; Nyāya reduces to anumāna; Nyāya position presented for contrast only)"
text_source: "Vedāntaparibhāṣā Ch.5 (Dharmarāja Adhvarin); Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.5 (Jaimini); Ślokavarttika — Arthāpattipariccheda (Kumārila Bhaṭṭa)"
tags:
  - pramana-shastra
  - epistemology
  - advaita-vedanta
  - mimamsa
  - postulation
  - tier-1
not:
  - term: "inference to the best explanation"
    why: "abductive inference (Peirce) selects the hypothesis that best explains the evidence, with 'best' doing crucial normative work; arthāpatti does not invoke 'best' but 'necessary' — the posited fact is not the most elegant explanation but the only one that can dissolve a specific contradiction between two established facts"
    instead: "Keep Postulation to Resolve an Inexplicable Fact untranslated; do not substitute the English term."
  - term: "abductive reasoning"
    why: "abduction moves from effect to hypothesis across open logical space; arthāpatti is forced by a specific tension between two known facts — the inference space is closed to one escape route"
  - term: "postulation (as a general term)"
    why: "'postulation' in English covers hypotheses, axioms, and speculative propositions; arthāpatti names a specific cognitive operation with precise conditions, not speculative positing generally"
  - term: "presumption"
    why: "legal and logical presumption is a default assumption held in absence of contrary evidence; arthāpatti arises from positive evidence (two conflicting facts), not from absence of evidence"
  - term: "speculation"
    why: "speculation implies tentativeness and open alternatives; arthāpatti produces knowledge that is as certain as the two established facts that necessitate it"
related:
  - /concepts/pramana.md
  - /concepts/anumana.md
  - /concepts/anupalabdhi.md
  - /concepts/badha-badhita.md
  - /concepts/shabda-pramana.md
timestamp: "2026-06-20"
okf_version: "0.2"
license: "CC BY-SA 4.0"
---

# Arthāpatti — अर्थापत्ति

**Not:** inference to the best explanation, abductive reasoning, postulation (as a general term), presumption, speculation

Arthāpatti is valid postulatory cognition — the knowledge that arises when two established facts (one witnessed, one learned) are incompatible under the available explanatory framework, and positing a third, unobserved fact is the only way to resolve the incompatibility. It is not speculation; it is necessitated by the tension between what is already known.

The classic example: Devadatta is known to be fat (*sthūlaḥ*) — this is witnessed. Devadatta is known to not eat during the day (*divā na bhuṅkte*) — this is established by reliable testimony. Both facts are certain; both concern the same person. A fat person who does not eat during the day is inexplicable unless there is another time at which they eat. Arthāpatti produces the cognition: Devadatta eats at night. This is not a guess; it is forced.

## Etymology

From Sanskrit *artha* (meaning, object, purpose, fact) + *āpatti* (arising, occurrence, encounter — from root *āpad*, to arrive at, fall into). The compound: the arising of meaning/fact; specifically, the arising of an explanatory posit forced by a known fact that is otherwise inexplicable (*anupapanna* — non-accounting).

The term *anupapatti* (non-accounting, inexplicability) is the trigger: when a known fact is *anupapanna* (cannot be accounted for) under the available framework, arthāpatti operates to posit what is required for *upapatti* (accounting, coherence).

## The Precise Conditions for Arthāpatti

Arthāpatti is not triggered by any mystery or open question. It requires:

1. **Two established facts** — not suspicions, not probabilities. One typically by pratyakṣa (witnessed), one typically by śabda (reliably established through testimony or scripture).
2. **A specific inexplicability** — the two facts are compatible only if a third fact obtains. The incompatibility is not vague but precise: *given that A is established and B is established, A and B can coexist only if C.*
3. **A unique posit** — the postulated fact is not "the best of several alternatives" but the only one that resolves the specific incompatibility. If multiple posits could equally resolve the tension, arthāpatti has not been triggered; doubt or inference may be more appropriate.

## Why Arthāpatti Is Not Anumāna

The Nyāya school reduces arthāpatti to anumāna. Mīmāṃsā (Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Ślokavarttika — Arthāpattipariccheda) and Advaita (Dharmarāja Adhvarin, Vedāntaparibhāṣā Ch.5) insist the reduction fails. The argument:

**Anumāna requires vyāpti** — an independently established invariable concomitance (wherever H, there is S). In the Devadatta case, what would the vyāpti be? There is no general rule "wherever a fat person doesn't eat during the day, they eat at night." The inference "Devadatta eats at night" does not flow from any pre-established vyāpti. What drives the posit is the *incompatibility of two specific known facts*, not a general pervasive connection.

**The direction of movement is different:** Anumāna moves from a positive mark (smoke) to an inferred entity (fire) via positive concomitance. Arthāpatti moves from a tension between two positive facts to a third fact whose positing dissolves the tension. The logical structure is distinct: "if not-C, then A-and-B are incompatible; A-and-B are established; therefore C."

Kumārila's further argument: if arthāpatti were anumāna, the 'mark' (hetu) in the inference would be "fatness of a person who doesn't eat in the daytime" — but this is not a mark whose vyāpti with "eating at night" has been independently observed. The Nyāya reduction would require a vyāpti that has never been established and cannot be established.

## Arthāpatti in Vedic Interpretation

Arthāpatti originates in Mīmāṃsā as a hermeneutic instrument. When a Vedic injunction and an observed fact appear to conflict, arthāpatti resolves the conflict by positing an implicit qualification.

Example (Mīmāṃsā): A Vedic passage says "one who desires heaven should perform the agnihotra." Another passage says "one should fast on ekādaśī." If someone cannot both perform the agnihotra and fast simultaneously (the fast interrupts the agnihotra schedule), the two injunctions are in tension. Arthāpatti resolves: the agnihotra injunction is implicitly qualified — it applies except on ekādaśī. The qualification is postulated (not stated) because it is the only way both injunctions can both hold.

Śaṅkara uses arthāpatti-type reasoning in the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya to reconcile Upaniṣadic statements that appear to attribute different natures to Brahman (saguna/nirguṇa; Brahman as creator/Brahman as pure consciousness). The resolution posits levels of discourse (vyāvahārika / pāramārthika — see those files) as the unstated but necessary framework that makes both sets of statements coherent.

## Arthāpatti and Brahman-Knowledge

Arthāpatti is a legitimate but indirect instrument in Advaita's approach to Brahman. Where pratyakṣa and anumāna cannot reach Brahman's nature, arthāpatti contributes by:

- Exposing the *anupapatti* (inexplicability) of the manifest world if Brahman (or some non-material ground) is not posited — this is an arthāpatti-type argument toward the necessity of a conscious ground
- Resolving textual tensions in Śruti through hermeneutic postulation

But arthāpatti is not a direct instrument for Brahman-knowledge — it relies on the tension between established facts to force its posit, and the facts of Brahman's intrinsic nature are not available as "established facts" that can create such tension. For direct Brahman-knowledge, śabda (Śruti) remains the primary instrument.

## Cross-References
- [Pramāṇa](pramana.md) — arthāpatti is the fifth pramāṇa in the Advaita six-pramāṇa list
- [Anumāna](anumana.md) — the pramāṇa with which arthāpatti is most often conflated; Nyāya reduces arthāpatti here; Mīmāṃsā and Advaita resist the reduction
- [Anupalabdhi](anupalabdhi.md) — the sixth Advaita pramāṇa; also contested as to independence from pratyakṣa
- [Bādha / Bādhita](badha-badhita.md) — sublation; the cognitive mechanism that establishes when a prior cognition must be revised; operates in tandem with arthāpatti in Vedic hermeneutics
- [Śabda / Āgama (pramāṇa)](shabda-pramana.md) — the pramāṇa that provides the 'established fact' component of arthāpatti in Vedic interpretive contexts

## Audience Metaphor

Like discovering that a student's exam score is top of the class, yet they never ask questions in class, never visit office hours, and claim to spend no extra time studying. Both facts are established. They cannot both be true under the assumption that performance tracks visible effort. The only escape from the contradiction: they study intensively in a setting you haven't observed. You haven't guessed — you've been forced by the two established facts to posit the one thing that makes both true.

## Citations

1. [Vedāntaparibhāṣā](/references/vedantaparibhasha.md) Ch.5 — Dharmarāja Adhvarin's analysis of arthāpatti as the fifth Advaita pramāṇa; definition and distinction from anumāna
2. [Mīmāṃsāsūtra](/references/mimamsa-sutra.md) 1.1.5 — Jaimini on postulation in the context of Vedic interpretation; arthāpatti as the operative instrument when injunction and observed fact conflict
3. [Ślokavarttika](/references/slokavarttika.md) — Arthāpattipariccheda — Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's extensive defence of arthāpatti as irreducible to anumāna
4. [Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya](/references/brahmasutra-bhasya.md) 2.1.14 — Śaṅkara's use of arthāpatti-type reasoning in reconciling apparently contradictory Upaniṣadic passages
