---
type: Concept
bundle: vedanta-epistemology
bundle_version: "0.3.0"
id: pramana
title: "Pramāṇa — Instrument of Valid Knowledge"
iast: "pramāṇa"
devanagari: "प्रमाण"
description: "Instrument of Valid Knowledge. Not proof, not evidence."
darshana:
  - Nyāya
  - Advaita Vedānta
  - Mīmāṃsā
school_scope: "cross-darśana (Advaita reading foregrounded; count and hierarchy differ by school)"
text_source: "Tarkasaṃgraha §1 (Annambhaṭṭa); Vedāntaparibhāṣā Ch.1 §1 (Dharmarāja Adhvarin)"
tags:
  - pramana-shastra
  - epistemology
  - advaita-vedanta
  - mimamsa
  - nyaya
  - cross-darshana
  - tier-1
  - gateway-concept
not:
  - term: "proof"
    why: "pramāṇa is not a logical demonstration that a proposition is true; it is the cognitive instrument that generates a specific type of knowledge-event (pramā)"
    instead: "Keep Instrument of Valid Knowledge untranslated; do not substitute the English term."
  - term: "evidence"
    why: "evidence is a Western legal and scientific category involving propositions that count in favour of a conclusion; pramāṇa is the source of knowing, not a unit of support"
  - term: "logical demonstration"
    why: "conflates pramāṇa with anumāna (one of the six); pramāṇa is the genus, not a species"
  - term: "epistemological method"
    why: "method implies a procedure that can be applied arbitrarily; pramāṇa is a specific cognitive instrument operative when the right conditions obtain"
  - term: "scientific verification"
    why: "imports the modern empiricist framework; pramāṇa theory operates across sensory, inferential, and scriptural domains without privileging empirical test"
  - term: "criterion of truth"
    why: "pramāṇa is not a standard by which claims are measured (that would be a truth-criterion in Western foundationalist epistemology); it is the operative cause of a valid cognition"
  - term: "justification condition"
    why: "translates pramāṇa into the JTB (Justified True Belief) framework; Advaita pramāṇa theory is not a theory of belief-justification but a theory of knowledge-production"
related:
  - /concepts/prama.md
  - /concepts/pratyaksha.md
  - /concepts/anumana.md
  - /concepts/shabda-pramana.md
  - /concepts/upamana.md
  - /concepts/arthapatti.md
  - /concepts/anupalabdhi.md
  - /concepts/pramata.md
  - /concepts/prameya.md
timestamp: "2026-06-20"
okf_version: "0.2"
license: "CC BY-SA 4.0"
---

# Pramāṇa — प्रमाण

**Not:** proof, evidence, logical demonstration, epistemological method, scientific verification, criterion of truth, justification condition

Pramāṇa is an instrument of valid knowledge (pramā-karaṇa) — the operative cognitive source through which a non-erroneous, non-previously-known cognition arises. It is not the knowledge itself, and it is not a standard against which claims are tested. It is the cause of a specific type of knowing-event.

The classical Indian pramāṇa śāstra (science of valid sources of knowledge) takes the pramāṇa as its central object: what kinds of cognitive instruments produce genuine knowledge, and how many are irreducibly distinct?

## Etymology

From Sanskrit *pra* (forward, forth) + *mā* (to measure, to know, from root *mā* — cognate with *māna*, measuring) + *aṇa* (instrument suffix). Literally: that which measures forth, i.e., the instrument by which genuine cognitive contact with a domain is achieved. The related term *pramā* names the result — valid cognition. The knower is *pramātā*; the object known is *prameya*.

The triad pramāṇa / pramā / pramātā (instrument / result / agent) frames the entire epistemological inquiry. Western epistemology typically focuses on the result and its conditions (when is a belief true and justified?). Indian pramāṇa theory focuses on the operative cause: what type of instrument produced this cognition, and is that instrument valid in this domain?

## What Pramāṇa Is (and Is Not)

Pramāṇa is not evidence. Evidence is a proposition (or set of propositions) that counts in favour of another proposition. Pramāṇa is a cognitive instrument — the channel through which knowing occurs. Pratyakṣa (direct perceptual contact), anumāna (inference via vyāpti), and śabda (authoritative verbal testimony) are not three grades of support for a claim. They are three distinct types of cognitive operation, each generating knowledge in its own domain.

Pramāṇa is not proof. Proof (in the Western logical or mathematical sense) is a sequence of propositions that entail a conclusion. Anumāna (the inferential pramāṇa) involves something like reasoning, but the Indian structure (the pañcāvayava argument) is not a proof in the deductive sense — it is a verbal expression of the inferential cognition that has already occurred in the inferring agent.

Pramāṇa is not a method. You do not apply pramāṇas the way you apply a research methodology. Each pramāṇa operates when the appropriate conditions obtain: pratyakṣa operates when the sense organs make contact with an object; anumāna operates when a linga (mark) whose vyāpti with the sādhya (inferable) has been established is perceived; śabda operates when words of an āpta (competent reliable speaker) are heard and their meaning understood.

## The Schools and Their Pramāṇa Lists

Cross-darśana disagreement on pramāṇa count is philosophically significant — each school's list encodes its ontological commitments:

| School | Pramāṇas Accepted | Count |
|--------|-------------------|-------|
| Cārvāka | Pratyakṣa only | 1 |
| Vaiśeṣika (early) | Pratyakṣa, Anumāna | 2 |
| Sāṃkhya-Yoga | Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Āgama | 3 |
| Nyāya | Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda | 4 |
| Advaita Vedānta | Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda, Arthāpatti, Anupalabdhi | 6 |
| Mīmāṃsā | Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda, Arthāpatti, Anupalabdhi | 6 |

The Advaita list follows Mīmāṃsā precisely — this is not coincidence. Advaita shares Mīmāṃsā's commitment to Śruti as an independent and supreme pramāṇa (not reducible to inference or testimony-in-the-ordinary-sense), and consequently accepts the full Mīmāṃsā list. Nyāya's reduction to four reflects its materialist-adjacent tendency to reduce postulation (arthāpatti) to inference and absence-cognition (anupalabdhi) to perception.

## Pramāṇa and Brahman: The Central Advaita Move

The question that drives Advaita's pramāṇa theory is not abstract: **Which pramāṇa is valid for the knowledge of Brahman?**

Śaṅkara's answer (Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya 1.1.1): neither pratyakṣa nor anumāna can reach Brahman. Pratyakṣa requires an object that stands before the sense organs — Brahman is not an object. Anumāna requires a perceptual base for vyāpti — there is no perceived correlation that could ground inference to the nature of Brahman. Therefore Śruti (verbal testimony of the ṛṣis, understood as apauruṣeya) is the only operative pramāṇa for Brahman-knowledge.

This is not a faith position. It is a pramāṇa-theoretical argument: Brahman's nature is not accessible through any instrument that operates on objects, and Śruti (as śabda-pramāṇa in the Advaita sense) is the instrument that conveys what direct realization has established. See *shabda-pramana.md* for the full treatment.

## Pramāṇa-phala: The Result Criterion

A pramāṇa is valid only if it produces *pramā* — valid, non-erroneous, non-previously-known cognition. This three-part criterion matters:

1. **Non-erroneous (abādhita):** The cognition must not be sublated (bādhita) by a subsequent cognition. A rope mistaken for a snake does not produce pramā — it is bhrānti (erroneous cognition). The subsequent cognition "it is a rope" sublates the prior.
2. **Non-previously-known (anadhigata):** Pramāṇa produces new knowledge. Recalling what is already known is not a pramāṇa operation — it is smṛti (memory), which is not a pramāṇa.
3. **Valid (pramā, not apramā):** Distinguished from invalid cognitions — illusion, doubt, error, memory.

## Cross-References
- [Pramā](prama.md) — the valid cognition produced by pramāṇa; the result, not the instrument
- [Pramātā](pramata.md) — the knowing subject; the agent in the pramāṇa triad
- [Prameya](prameya.md) — the knowable object; the domain of a given pramāṇa
- [Pratyakṣa](pratyaksha.md) — direct-contact cognition; first and most basic pramāṇa
- [Anumāna](anumana.md) — inferential cognition; second pramāṇa
- [Śabda / Āgama (pramāṇa)](shabda-pramana.md) — verbal testimony; the pramāṇa for Brahman-knowledge
- [Upamāna](upamana.md) — comparison-cognition; fourth pramāṇa
- [Arthāpatti](arthapatti.md) — postulation; fifth pramāṇa
- [Anupalabdhi](anupalabdhi.md) — non-cognition of the perceptible; sixth pramāṇa
- [Svataḥprāmāṇya](svatahpramanya.md) — Mīmāṃsā/Advaita doctrine that validity is intrinsic, not established by external verification

## Audience Metaphor

Like asking whether you learned something from reading (śabda), seeing it yourself (pratyakṣa), or reasoning it through (anumāna) — these are different cognitive instruments, not different grades of courtroom evidence. The instrument itself, not the conclusion it supports, is what pramāṇa names.

## Citations

1. [Tarkasaṃgraha](/references/tarkasangraha.md) §1 — Annambhaṭṭa's definition: pramāṇa is the instrument of valid cognition (pramākaraṇam)
2. [Vedāntaparibhāṣā](/references/vedantaparibhasha.md) Ch.1 §1 — Dharmarāja Adhvarin on the six pramāṇas of Advaita Vedānta
3. Nyāyadarśana 1.1.3 — Gautama's four-pramāṇa list with commentary
4. [Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya](/references/brahmasutra-bhasya.md) 1.1.1 — Śaṅkara on Śruti as the only pramāṇa adequate to Brahman-knowledge
5. Cross-bundle note: this file's own table already lists the Sāṃkhya-Yoga three-pramāṇa count; sankhya-darshana v0.13's pramana-samkhya.md is now the third school-scoped full treatment (after this Advaita-foregrounded entry and nyaya-vaisheshika v0.9's four-pramāṇa Nyāya treatment)
