---
type: Concept
bundle: vedanta-epistemology
bundle_version: "0.3.0"
id: prama
title: "Pramā — Veridical Cognition (Result of a Pramāṇa-Event)"
iast: "pramā"
devanagari: "प्रमा"
description: "Veridical Cognition (Result of a Pramāṇa-Event). Not truth (propositional), not justified true belief (JTB)."
darshana:
  - Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika
  - Advaita Vedānta
school_scope: "Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta primarily (pramā as the technical term for the valid cognition that is the result [phala] of the pramāṇa-triad operation; Nyāya defines pramā as yathārthanubhava — a cognition corresponding to its object; Mīmāṃsā uses pramā similarly but with the added Prābhākara distinction of pramāṇa-phala from pramāṇa-vyāpāra; Advaita inherits the Mīmāṃsā-Nyāya framework and applies it at the vyāvahārika level, adding the distinctive move that brahma-jñāna is a pramā of a special kind — one that bādhita-s all prior vyāvahārika pramās about the empirical self and world; Dvaita Vedānta also employs the pramā framework but the resulting cognitions concern Viṣṇu, jīva, and the world as eternally distinct realities)"
text_source: "Vedāntaparibhāṣā Ch.1 (Dharmarājādhvarīndra — the most precise Advaita treatment of pramā vs. apramā, and the relations among pramātṛ-pramāṇa-prameya-pramā); Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1 (Gautama — pramāṇa as the generic term, with pramā (valid cognition) as its defining result); Tattvabodha (attributed to Śaṅkara — the introductory teaching of the pramāṇa-triad: pramātā [knower], pramāṇa [instrument], prameya [object], pramā [valid cognition]); Nyāyakusumāñjali 1.1 (Udayana — pramā as yathārtha-jñāna, a cognition that corresponds to its object)"
tags:
  - advaita-vedanta
  - nyaya
  - epistemology
  - pramana
  - valid-cognition
  - tier-3
not:
  - term: "truth (propositional)"
    why: "pramā is a cognition (a jñāna-event), not a proposition's truth-value; Indian epistemology is primarily concerned with cognitions (episodes of knowing) rather than propositions (statements that have truth conditions); pramā names the cognitive event in which a knower cognizes an object as it actually is — it is not the abstract truth-value of a sentence about that event; translating pramā as \"truth\" slides from epistemology into logic in a way that distorts the Indian framework"
    instead: "Keep Veridical Cognition untranslated; do not substitute the English term."
  - term: "justified true belief (JTB)"
    why: "the Gettier-problem-adjacent philosophical analysis of knowledge as a state constituted by truth + belief + justification has no parallel in the pramā framework; pramā is not a dispositional state (belief) but a cognitive episode; pramā is not \"justified\" by external reasons but is self-validating (svataḥprāmāṇya) — its validity is intrinsic and is only defeated by subsequent sublation (bādha); the justification idiom of post-Gettier Anglo-American epistemology does not map onto the Indian pramāṇa analysis"
  - term: "knowledge (generic English)"
    why: "pramā is the technical term for the valid-cognition result of a pramāṇa-event; using the English word \"knowledge\" for pramā conflates it with the broader term jñāna (any cognition) and with the still broader term anubhava (any non-mnemonic cognition); in Advaita's layered vocabulary: jñāna (cognition broadly) > anubhava (non-mnemonic cognition) > pramā (veridical non-mnemonic cognition) > brahma-jñāna (the liberative form of pramā); each term is more specific than the previous; \"knowledge\" for pramā collapses these distinctions"
  - term: "belief (doxastic)"
    why: "a belief in Western philosophy is a standing mental state that persists over time; pramā is a cognitive event — a momentary or occurrent episode in which an object is cognized as it is; in Nyāya, pramā arises, exists for a moment, and is succeeded by smṛti (memory) or by a further pramā; the belief framework's dispositional, standing-state character does not fit the pramā analysis"
  - term: "correct perception"
    why: "pramā can be produced by any of the pramāṇas (not only pratyakṣa); a valid inference (anumāna) and a valid scriptural cognition (śabda) both produce pramā; limiting pramā to perception misses the broader pramāṇa framework"
  - term: "apramā (invalid cognition)"
    why: "the critical negative case: apramā is cognition that does not correspond to its object (anyathākhyāti — a cognition of something as other than it is); the snake-cognition in poor light is apramā; adhyāsa-produced cognitions are apramā; the entire Advaita analysis of avidyā depends on the pramā/apramā distinction — avidyā produces systematic apramā (the jīva as separate self in a real world); brahma-jñāna is the pramā that bādhita-s all prior apramā about the nature of the self"
related:
  - /concepts/pramana.md
  - /concepts/pramata.md
  - /concepts/prameya.md
  - /concepts/anubhava.md
  - /concepts/svatahpramanya.md
  - /concepts/badha-badhita.md
  - /concepts/adhyasa.md
  - /concepts/avidya.md
timestamp: "2026-06-20"
okf_version: "0.2"
license: "CC BY-SA 4.0"
---

# Pramā — प्रमा

**Not:** truth (propositional), justified true belief (JTB), knowledge (generic English), belief (doxastic), correct perception, apramā (invalid cognition)

**Pramā** is the Sanskrit epistemological term for **veridical cognition** — the valid result produced when a pramāṇa (instrument of valid cognition) operates on a prameya (object of cognition) and delivers a cognition that corresponds to its object. It is the *phala* (result, outcome) of the pramāṇa-triad: pramātṛ (knowing subject) + pramāṇa (instrument) + prameya (object) → pramā (valid cognition).

The term appears in its most technically precise form in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā traditions but is foundational to Advaita Vedānta's epistemological architecture as well. The Tattvabodha (attributed to Śaṅkara) introduces the pramāṇa-triad as the basic structure of Advaita epistemology: the student must know how the instruments of valid cognition work before understanding how brahma-jñāna — the liberative pramā — operates within and ultimately overturns that framework.

## Etymology

From Sanskrit *pra-* (prefix: forward, complete, fully) + *māna* (from root *mā*, to measure, to cognize) → *pramā*: a completed, fully effected cognition; a cognition that has measured (arrived at) its object as it actually is. The *pra-* prefix distinguishes *pramā* (successful, veridical cognition) from mere *māna* (measuring attempt) and from *apramā* (invalid, non-corresponding cognition; *a-pramā* — the negation).

## The Pramāṇa-Triad and Pramā as Phala

Advaita Vedānta (following Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya) analyzes every valid epistemic event into four structural elements:

| Element | Sanskrit | Role |
|---------|----------|------|
| **Knower** | Pramātṛ | The cognitive subject; the witness-awareness operating through the antaḥkaraṇa (mind-complex) |
| **Instrument** | Pramāṇa | The means by which the object is cognized: pratyakṣa, anumāna, śabda, upamāna, arthāpatti, anupalabdhi |
| **Object** | Prameya | What is cognized; the domain of the pramāṇa; differs by pramāṇa type |
| **Valid cognition** | Pramā | The result: the cognition that corresponds to its object |

Pramā is thus not the pramāṇa itself (the instrument) but the cognitive result produced when the instrument functions correctly on its object. The distinction matters: a valid pramāṇa that is obstructed by doṣa (defect) does not produce pramā. A defective instrument (miscalibrated sense organ, doṣa-laden mind) produces apramā even when the object is present.

## Definition: Three Conditions for Pramā

The Vedāntaparibhāṣā Ch.1 builds the Advaita definition of pramā from three conditions:

**Condition 1: Anubhava (non-mnemonic cognition)** — pramā must be a fresh cognitive event, not a recollection. Smṛti (memory of "the fire I saw yesterday") is not pramā even if accurate, because it is recollection of a prior cognition, not a new epistemic contact.

**Condition 2: Yathārthatva (object-correspondence)** — the cognition must correspond to its object: it must cognize the object as it actually is, not as other than it is (anyathākhyāti). Cognizing the rope as a snake is anyathā-khyāti — cognizing something as other than it is — and is therefore apramā.

**Condition 3: Non-sublation (abādhitatva)** — the cognition must not be subsequently sublated (bādhita) by a higher or stronger cognition. A cognition of silver in a shell (śukti-rajata) appears veridical until closer inspection reveals the shell: the shell-silver cognition is retroactively bādhita and revealed as apramā. A cognition that survives all subsequent investigation is pramā.

## Pramā and Svataḥprāmāṇya

The Advaita-Mīmāṃsā position (see svatahpramanya.md) holds that pramā is self-validating (*svataḥprāmāṇya*): the validity of a pramā is intrinsic to the cognition itself, not dependent on external confirmation. When a pramā arises (say, the cognition "this is fire"), its validity is not produced by a subsequent meta-cognition ("my cognition of fire is valid"); the fire-cognition is self-warranted by its arising.

This is in contrast to the Nyāya position (parataḥprāmāṇya): that the validity of a cognition requires external confirmation — a subsequent checking-cognition or the track record of the instrument. The Advaita-Mīmāṃsā argument: if validity required an external validator, that validator would itself require validation, producing an infinite regress; svataḥprāmāṇya blocks the regress.

The practical consequence: a pramā needs no independent justification. It is valid until bādhita. The burden of proof falls on the bādha, not on the pramā.

## Pramā vs. Apramā: The Advaita Soteriological Stakes

The pramā/apramā distinction carries enormous soteriological weight in Advaita:

**Avidyā as the source of systematic apramā:** Every cognition of the jīva as a separate self in an independently real world is, from the pāramārthika standpoint, apramā — it cognizes the appearance (mithyā jīva, mithyā jagat) as if it were the ultimately real. The cognition "I am this body-mind" is apramā because the body-mind is not the ultimate reality of the cognizer.

**Brahma-jñāna as the definitive pramā:** The liberative cognition "aham brahmāsmi" (I am Brahman) is the pramā that bādhita-s all prior apramās about the self. It corresponds to the object (Brahman, which is the actual nature of the cognizer) without the distortion of avidyā, meets the three conditions (it is anubhava; it is yathārtha — it corresponds to Brahman as the actual reality; it is the trikālābādhita cognition, never sublatable), and is self-validating.

**The paradox:** From the vyāvahārika standpoint, brahma-jñāna is a pramā — a valid cognition produced by the śabda-pramāṇa (Mahāvākya-śabda) on the prameya (Brahman). From the pāramārthika standpoint, brahma-jñāna dissolves the pramātṛ-pramāṇa-prameya-pramā structure itself — because Brahman is neither subject to knowing nor an object of knowing but the awareness in which all such structures appear. The pramā framework is vyāvahārika scaffolding that is dismantled in the very act of successful brahma-jñāna.

## Pramā Across the Six Pramāṇas

Each pramāṇa produces pramā within its domain:

| Pramāṇa | Domain | Example pramā |
|---------|--------|---------------|
| Pratyakṣa | Perceptible present objects | "This fire is hot" (tactile-thermal) |
| Anumāna | Inferrable facts via liṅga | "There is fire on that hill" (inferring from smoke) |
| Śabda / Āgama | Testimony of valid speakers; Vedic statements | "Ātman is Brahman" (Mahāvākya-śabda) |
| Upamāna | Analogical cognition: similarity-based | "The wild cow is like a domestic cow" |
| Arthāpatti | Postulation from incongruent facts | "Devadatta must eat at night" (because he is fat but eats nothing by day) |
| Anupalabdhi | Cognition from non-apprehension | "There is no pot on the table" |

The pramā produced by each pramāṇa carries the scope and authority of that pramāṇa. Pratyakṣa-produced pramā covers the domain of sensible present objects. Śabda-produced pramā covers what language can validly transmit — including, in the Mīmāṃsā-Advaita view, the Mahāvākyas' transmission of the ātman-Brahman identity.

## The Vyāvahārika Persistence of Pramā After Aparokṣa-anubhūti

A key Advaita position: after aparokṣa-anubhūti, the jīvanmukta continues to operate in the vyāvahārika world, which means the ordinary pramāṇas continue to produce ordinary pramās. The jīvanmukta sees fire, infers rain from clouds, hears instruction. These pramās operate normally. What has changed is the root context: these pramās no longer occur within the superimposed framework of "I am a separate self in an independently real world." The jīvanmukta has the pramā "this is fire" without the accompanying adhyāsic context "and I am a body that can be burned by this fire as an ultimate ontological reality."

The vyāvahārika pramās remain; the adhyāsic metadata that surrounded them is removed.

## Cross-References
- [Pramāṇa](pramana.md) — the instrument that produces pramā; pramāṇa and pramā are logically paired; all six pramāṇas are defined by what pramā they produce and in what domain
- [Pramātṛ](pramata.md) — the knowing subject; pramā is produced by the operation of pramāṇa by pramātṛ on prameya; pramātṛ is the subject-element of the triad
- [Prameya](prameya.md) — the object known; pramā is the cognition of the prameya; what makes a cognition pramā is that it corresponds to the prameya as it actually is
- [Anubhava](anubhava.md) — the broader category: anubhava is any non-mnemonic cognition (valid or invalid); pramā is the subset of anubhava that is yathārtha (object-corresponding) and non-sublated
- [Svataḥprāmāṇya](svatahpramanya.md) — the Advaita-Mīmāṃsā position that pramā's validity is intrinsic and does not require external validation; the theory that grounds why pramā does not require justification beyond itself
- [Bādha / Bādhita](badha-badhita.md) — the sublation that retroactively reveals a cognition as apramā (the rope-cognition bādhita-s the snake-cognition); brahma-jñāna as the trikālābādhita pramā — the cognition that is never sublated
- [Adhyāsa](adhyasa.md) — the mechanism that produces apramā; adhyāsa generates cognitions of the self-as-body-mind and world-as-independently-real that are systematically apramā; brahma-jñāna is the pramā that removes the root adhyāsa
- [Avidyā](avidya.md) — the deeper condition that makes adhyāsa-produced apramā possible; avidyā as the epistemic condition that surrounds all vyāvahārika cognition with the superimposed context of separate-self reality

## Audience Metaphor

A surveyor's measurement of a plot of land is pramā if it corresponds to the actual dimensions of the plot — the measurement instrument (theodolite, measuring tape) worked correctly, the conditions were adequate, and the result matches the land. An incorrect measurement (instrument miscalibrated, tape kinked) is apramā — it does not correspond to the object. The Advaita move: the surveyor's measurements of the jīva ('this body-mind complex is my self') and the world ('these objects are independently real') are systematic apramā, produced not by kinked tape but by avidyā. Brahma-jñāna is the survey that finally measures correctly — and in measuring correctly, discovers that the entire territory was Brahman, and the surveyor was too.

## Citations

1. [Nyāyasūtra](/references/nyaya-sutra.md) 1.1.1 (Gautama) — the first Nyāya-Sūtra establishes the central project: the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) and their results (pramā); pramāṇa and pramā are logically paired from the start; all subsequent Nyāya epistemology elaborates what counts as pramāṇa and what constitutes its pramā-result
2. [Vedāntaparibhāṣā](/references/vedantaparibhasha.md) Ch.1 (Dharmarājādhvarīndra) — the Advaita definitional account: pramā is anubhava (non-mnemonic cognition) that is yathārtha (corresponding to its object) and that is not subsequently bādhita (sublated by a higher cognition); the definition builds in three conditions: fresh cognition + object-correspondence + non-sublation
3. [Tattvabodha](/references/tattvabodha.md) (attributed to Śaṅkara) — the pedagogical introduction of the pramāṇa-triad in Advaita Vedānta: pramātṛ (knowing subject), pramāṇa (instrument of valid cognition), prameya (object to be known), pramā (valid cognition as result); these four are the structural elements of every valid epistemic event
4. [Nyāyakusumāñjali](/references/nyayakusumanjali.md) 1.1 (Udayana) — pramā as yathārtha-jñāna: cognition that corresponds to (yathārtha) its object; a cognition of pot that corresponds to the pot is pramā; a cognition of snake in what is a rope is apramā
